

PHOTOGRAPHIC IMAGE
AND ITS CONTEXTUALIZATION AS ART

A THESIS
SUBMITTED TO THE INSTITUTE OF
ECONOMICS AND SOCIAL SCIENCES OF
SILKENT UNIVERSITY
IN PARTIAL FULFILLMENT OF THE REQUIREMENTS
FOR THE DEGREE OF
DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY
IN ART, DESIGN AND ARCHITECTURE

By
Gülser İNCELLIOĞLU
June, 1996


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**PHOTOGRAPHIC IMAGE
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
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
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
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
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ABSTRACT

PHOTOGRAPHIC IMAGE AND ITS CONTEXTUALIZATION AS ART

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Ph.D. in A.D.A.

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June, 1996

Throughout its history, the photographic image was mostly accepted as worthy of art status when seen within the parameters that apply to the traditional images, for example, paintings. The main theme of this study is to lay out the intrinsic characteristics of photography and to find the ways that photographs are contextualized as art, outside and independent of these parameters. To achieve this, a considerable part of this research is devoted to the issues of representation that relate both traditional art media and the technical images like photography to production of artworks. These include pictorial techniques like perspective and abstraction as well as other modes of representation made possible by photographic technology. Following this, the argument focuses on artistic practices that contextualize photographs and utilize their advantages, like montage and conceptual art, and further, the similarities of the photographic image and common objects used in art context are analyzed. The study concludes with a discussion on the status of the artwork in our times, as the photographic image is increasingly intertwined with the digital technology, scrutinizing the all important parameters of representation and art.

Keywords: Photography, Visual Arts, Representation

ÖZET

FOTOĞRAF GÖRÜNTÜSÜ VE SANAT BAĞLAMINDAKİ KULLANIMI

Güven İncirlioğlu

Sanat, Tasarım ve Mimarlık Doktora Programı

Tez Yöneticisi: Doç.Dr. İhsan Derman

Haziran, 1996

Fotoğraf görüntüsü geçmişte sanat yapıtı olarak kabul edilebilmesi için genellikle resim gibi geleneksel görüntülere bağlı olarak değerlendirildi. Bu çalışmanın ana konusu, fotoğrafın kendine özgü özelliklerini ortaya çıkarmak, ve resme ait kriterlerden bağımsız olarak hangi yollardan sanat bağlamına girdiğini incelemek. Bunun için, bu tezin önemli bir bölümü teknik ve geleneksel görüntülerin her ikisini de sanat üretimine bağlayan 'yenidensunum'un değişkenlerine ayrılmıştır. Bunlar arasında perspektif ve soyutlama gibi resme ait kavramların yanı sıra fotoğraf teknolojisinin getirdiği yenidensunum biçimleri de vardır. Daha sonra, fotomontaj ve kavramsal sanat gibi fotoğrafın avantajlarını kullanıp onu sanat bağlamının içine dahil eden bazı yöntemler incelenmiş ve fotoğraf ile sanat üretiminde kullanılan sıradan nesneler arasındaki benzerliklerin üstünde durulmuştur. Tartışmayı tamamlamak için de günümüzün sayısal teknolojisi, fotoğraf görüntüsünün bu teknoloji içindeki paradoksal durumu ve bütün bunların yenidensunum ve sanat yapıtı gibi kavramlara olan etkisi irdelenmiştir.

Anahtar Sözcükler: Fotoğraf, Görsel Sanatlar, Yenidensunum.

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

First and foremost, my deepest thanks goes to İhsan Derman, my advisor and a good friend: without his support, this study could not have been realized.

I also would like to give credit to Neziğ Erdoğan and Aysen Savas for their patience and time, and their support in supplying new ideas and directions.

And last, but not the least, I would like to acknowledge the most obvious and lively interaction that in turn inspired many of the ideas in most things I tried to accomplish. Within the relatively short time that I taught, I realized that I owe a lot to my students whose company always kept me enthusiastic, energetic and well aware of the cultural zeitgeist of this country.

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Preface

In the media dominated environment we are living, technical images are being consumed at an enormous rate through printed press, television and digital media. And possibly, the oldest form of image making to prevail in what we know as the mass media today is photography. However, in this image-world of the mediatic, an important problem becomes apparent: That of art's position. This position is getting more ambiguous in regard to, (or against, or within) the media as a general term, and photographs are the images to play on this ambiguity the most. The 'Media,' this rather abstract entity, works on the diffusion of differences of class, race, gender, color and also, of what is art and what is not, let alone good and bad art. So, one should suppose that a new status for art/photography should be reinstated in the age of the media. And this, though not a plea for the resurrection of 'Art' as opposed to the popular media at all, supplies a modest link between the purpose of this research and the times we are living. That is, the grounds for its urgency, also for an artist, when faced with the impossibility of making photographs in a mediatic age.

As a practicing artist, I do feel the necessity to confront the issues of art theory, not as the legitimization of what I produce as artworks, but to understand the nature of image-making and ultimately attempt to conceptualize a definition of this particular artistic activity. By this, I do not mean to disregard the importance of spontaneity and a degree of intuition in the making of photographs, and of art. But given the times and the special cultural context, and moreover, the puzzling relation between the idea of art and photographic images today, that is in times of picture

making labeled as ‘post-photographic,’ a redefinition of practice becomes inescapable. When visual arts are considered, this specific context is sometimes referred to as a complete liberation, or an orgy, in which the artist is relieved from all the historical obligations of art production: “Art can be externally dictated to, in terms either of fashion or of politics, but internal dictation by the pulse of its own history is now a thing of the past.” (Danto 1992: 9) Thus, everything is permitted for the artist, since nothing is historically mandated, in what Danto calls the “Post-Historical period of art”. In fact, the validity of any argument on ‘representation’ should be questioned, since they appear exhausted during this ‘orgy’, becoming irrelevant of the definitions of art:

The orgy is in a way the whole explosive movement of modernity, with its various kinds of liberation –political liberation, sexual liberation,the liberation of art- the assumption of all models of representation, of all models of anti-representation.....We have exhausted all means of the production and virtual overproduction of objects, signs, messages, ideologies, pleasure.
(Baudrillard, 1989: 182)

However, I value the rather odd cultural chemistry of a geography that contributes to one’s artistic production, that is, the case of Türkiye. At first, I see no problems of art being externally dictated to especially by ‘politics’, that is an extended idea of politics. To me, this extended idea comes to mean that art itself has always been political, even when it deals with its own definition. In this case, politics is something to be separated from a professional status or practice, appointed either through force or an election within an apparatus that refer more to a practice of management (i.e. of state). Real politics, if there may be such a term, is done through civil channels, and it involves cultural transformations. Obviously, for me, art offers the most functional field of this kind of a transformation, supplying a type of knowledge that no theoretical treatise can. But nevertheless, one should take extreme caution in order to separate art theory from politics in general. Consequently, when art is

employed by politics, that is, an “aesthetization of politics” , then the questions regarding the existence of art is once more diverted into confusion.¹ This brings me to state that the kind of art theory this study will investigate in order to make clear the ways that photographs are contextualized as art, should diverge from the theories of media that explain photographic images as consequences of ideology in general, as shall be discussed in the introduction.

In any case, aside from all personal account on the choice of subject and how it relates to a specific time and a setting, the ultimate aim of this research is to build the foundations to claim that the photographic image is mostly ‘contextualized’ as art, rather than being an art object on its own right, independent of its conditions of existence and production. This requires a transfiguration: while the theories of pictorial representation suggest similarities in between pictorial arts (i.e. painting) and photography, the goal of this study is to show that ‘meaning’ in photographic image is far from being secure, and photographs are more apt to be appropriated within an art context, similar to the conditions of the everyday objects that go into a like circulation in order to ‘transfigure the commonplace’ and offer a unique type of knowledge. And this brings me back to the importance of the specific geographical location and the cultural conditions in which this research is conceptualized and prepared.

Throughout this written text, it will obviously be clear that almost all theoretical references follow a particular frame, that is, of the western mind. However, this should not come to mean that I situate the particular condition of Türkiye totally inside the

¹Walter Benjamin warns about politics being aesthetized in “The Work of Art in the Age of Mechanical Reproduction”: “Fascism,as Marinetti admits, expects war to supply the artistic gratification of a sense perception that has been changed by technology. This is evidently the consummation of *l’art pour l’art*. ‘ Mankind, which in Homer’s time was an object of contemplation for the Olympian gods, now is one for itself. Its self-alienation has reached such a degree that it can experience its own destruction as an aesthetic pleasure of the first order. This is the situation of politics which Fascism is rendering aesthetic.” (1969: 242) Through this, I once more want to emphasize the current condition of ‘Media.’

western frame of reference, or neither completely outside it. I simply want to suggest that this condition of being 'in between' creates a tension that is of utmost importance for generating ideas and concepts which in turn yields significant works of art. But to separate this kind of production from the 'regional' and 'folkloric' traditions of art, one should refer to another tradition of a sort, that is a 'technology' of producing artworks that so occupied the western mind for ages. Obviously this term does not only signify the media or the tools of art production, but also the theory and an evolving philosophy that comes with it. And hence the importance of theory as such for this research, and further for the use of this understanding of technology in artistic production even when dealing with the local phenomena (ie. politics, as above). With the possibility of citing various authors on the crisis of the project of enlightenment, and with it of the western epistemology as evolved in the past several centuries, I once more want to stress the significance of the special conditions that this country possesses and possibilities it offers for an artist that can enjoy an insider's information on its culture and can transform it to new modes of knowing. And to me, in this case, photography becomes the most useful of means, as the special order of the non-western world makes itself manifest in visual terms, and particularly in the world of objects. It means that this 'in between' condition, possibly a kind of social schizophrenia induced on the ones disjunct in between tradition and change (in the western sense), is reflected on the objects (of common use, technological or else) and the environment (mostly, built). In short, following the traces of this special frame of mind as observed in visible phenomena, and using the photograph to displace the object, the possibilities of artistic production as a critique of culture (both traditional and western) are obviously far reaching. To sum up, I should remind the reader that the conditions of the 'heterotopia' as an antithesis of utopia and as challenging the norms of the western behavior and thinking

are relevant to what has been said above. The term, as defined by Michel Foucault, is further discussed in this thesis especially in relation to favorable cases in which photographs are contextualized as art. I do not want to claim that heterotopias fully explain the phenomena of specific locales (ie. Türkiye), but nevertheless they offer new modes of knowledge in the time of crisis.

Introduction

Apart from the history of photography as a chronological classification of photographic modes (i.e. documentary, pictorial) as they relate to art, technology and society at large, the significant writings concerning photography can be said to have focused on two main issues, by a degree of generalization. In fact, whether these two can be completely separated still remains a question. In any case, if one is allowed to attempt pinning them down, they are as follows: The first issue specifically focuses on the nature of photographic image as a trace of the visible world. Within this account the operational mode of the photographic apparatus, as it specially is an anthropomorphic replica of vision and its mechanics, becomes important. In other words, whether as an extension of the human eye, or as simply imitating it, the camera image is the subject of analysis within its confines. Thus at first look, the theories of pictorial representation as concerning the issues of resemblance, imitation, and by the same token, abstraction, appear to be more relevant to this category, somewhat excluding the social and ideological associations of representation. To extend the theoretical territory of this category, one may include the psychology of perception, and furthermore the similarities and differences of photographic recording and memory. The perception of third dimension, binocular vision, and its two dimensional simile as the photograph occupies an important part in it. Even when this category is not fully apt to be labeled as the “natural” or “nature-bound” account of photographic

image, it helped change the epistemological function of photographs in modern, positivistic culture.

Then comes the second issue, imbedded in the above cultural milieu, but concerning another 'nature' of photographs, that is, their ability to be easily accessible and be duplicated. In accordance with other modern phenomena as industrialization and mass production, the reproducible character of photographs had been the subject of very important writings, all of which foresee a transformation of culture and the artistic endeavor in modern times. Starting very early after the invention of photography, either as an aphorism of the new medium from the realm of art,¹ or on the contrary, as offering immense possibilities in creativity, this category finds its ultimate form in Walter Benjamin's writings. This transformation, which in turn refers to visual representation, at first marks a kind of democratization: a dispersion through the mass reproduction of artworks by using photography. Thus, the destruction of the aura of the artwork, that is its imbeddedness in specific time and place as a unique object is the main theme of "The Work of Art in the Age of Mechanical Reproduction". (1969: 217-251) However, this is not the only way that Benjamin handles the question of aura. Writing on Eugene Atget's photographs, he comments thus:²

He was the first to disinfect the stifling atmosphere generated by conventional portrait photography in the age of decline. He cleanses this atmosphere, indeed he dispels it altogether: he initiates the emancipation of object from aura which is the most signal achievement of the latest school of photography. When avant-garde periodicals like *Bifur* or *Variété* publish pictures captioned *Westminster*, *Lille*, *Antwerp* or *Breslau* but showing only details, here a piece of balustrade, there a tree-top whose bare branches criss-cross a gas lamp, or a gable wall, or a lamp-post with a life-buoy bearing the name of the town - this is nothing but a literary refinement of themes that Atget discovered. He

¹The very often quoted author on the subject of the validity of photographs as an art form in the early days is Charles Baudelaire and his address for the Salon of 1859.

²Eugene Atget was active as a photographer in Paris roughly between 1900 and late 1920's. While not being recognized in his lifetime, his posthumous fame came when his work was compiled and published by an American photographer, Berenice Abbot.

looked for what was unremarked, forgotten, cast adrift, and thus such pictures too work against the exotic, romantically sonorous names of the cities; they pump the aura out of reality like water from a sinking ship. What is aura, actually? A strange weave of space and time: the unique appearance or semblance of distance, no matter how close the object may be. (1979: 250)

From Benjamin's point of view from early 1930's, the transformation in the very notion of art to anticipate the reproduction of images in mass media declared a transition from the formal logic of traditional images -i.e. paintings- to that of the dialectical logic of photography, in Paul Virilio's terms. As an extension of this argument on photography, and indicating a recent transformation, Virilio, writing in 1990's, differentiates between the ages of the image as that of 'formal logic,' belonging to traditional images like painting; of 'dialectical logic,' for the age of photography and film; and of 'paradoxical logic,' belonging to video recording, holography and computer graphics. (1994: 63) The attributes of these, that are "real," "actual," and "virtual," respectively, indicate the reconfigurations of epistemology in modern era. How photography takes its place in the paradoxical logic of our time, and how this redefines the field of art remains to be resolved. Nevertheless, it will suffice for now to say that the very notion of the photographic print as an artifact on paper, as an artwork with an aura itself, or as a commodity distributed through the regular channels of print media, or as an authentic record of reality, and its ties to problems of visual representation of traditional media are to be questioned. The relative success of this study thus will remain in what is construed through the survey of these phases of image making that are validated as artistic production.

As a supporting argument, Jonathan Crary claims that the more important aspect of modernity is the observer that is shaped by historical-technological conditions, and especially when photography is concerned, by a 'proliferation of signs on demand':

Imitations, copies, counterfeits, and the techniques to produce them were all challenges to the aristocratic monopoly and control of signs. The problem of mimesis here is not one of aesthetics but of social power, a power founded on the capacity to produce equivalencies..... Photography and money become homologous forms of social power in the nineteenth century. They are equally totalizing systems for binding and unifying all subjects within a single global network of valuation and desire. (1990: 13)

According to Crary, to take the 'shifts in representational practices,' that is, the modernist rupture from normative perspectival model of vision specifically at the end of the nineteenth century, is a futile attempt at isolating perception. Instead, the observer that is shaped by the optical devices including the camera obscura should be taken into account: "For the problem of the observer is the field on which vision in history can be said to materialize, to become itself visible." (1990: 5) Supplying a very unique link between the early nineteenth century mechanical aids to vision and our times shaped by the digital imagery, Crary poses valuable questions for this research.

When art is concerned, an effort of this kind should take into consideration the historical outlook (not to say development) of the problem of representation, and moreover, its extended resonance in style, expression and abstraction in art. The past that is concerned here is to be bound to the existence of photography as we know it today, that is roughly 150 years. This necessity, by no means discarding the insight that previous artworks offer in above terms, is dictated by the need to reconcile the photographic image with the idea of 'Modern', artistically. The main issue is the attempt to understand the course of photography through 19th and 20th centuries in close connection with, above all else, painting. In simplified form, this course can be laid out as possible answers to a number of questions put in chronological order:

1. What has been the effect of paintings on the photographic image in the nineteenth century?
2. Can the first question be reversed?
3. Could photography follow the apparent break (or discontinuity) in tradition that first the impressionists and later the cubists established in painting? After all, was this a possibility?
4. If not, what were the possibilities for photography to autonomously exist as an artistic medium?
5. How can we explain the role of photographic image in historical avant-garde art of the twentieth century?
6. What are the possibilities of painterly abstraction in photographic terms?
7. What became of photographs since Pop Art?
8. Can the possible answers to these questions be enough to project into the era of digital imagery?

Obviously, this set of questions directly aims to juxtapose the artistic parameters of photography with those of painting. Within the method of this writing, this juxtaposition will help to a certain degree. In most common accounts, photography as an art medium among the others is usually placed somewhere in between painting and film, sharing the static image with painting and the camera with film. (Burgin, 1984: 40) However, due to shifting emphasis on conventional art media through time and to techniques employed at intervals throughout the past 150 years, photography has also been placed next to theater (Barthes, 1991: 31), and even sculpture as concerned with organization of space. (Morgan, 1994: 59)

Meanwhile, the twentieth century modernism is considered to have a special interest in exploiting the optimum possibilities of each art medium in itself as separated, a kind of search into the very essentials, for example, of photography. This kind of purism, as it is called by Grundberg and McCarthy-Gauss, (1987: 135) conceptually (and ironically) ties the problems of abstraction in painting, again with the 'photographic.' But ultimately, whether any kind of juxtaposition or separation of different art media is plausible today is still to be answered.

The primary concern of this research is not to write another 'History of Photography' as it relates to the issues of art. The reason for emphasizing this deserves special attention. The historian of photography, with some exceptional cases, attempts to work as an art historian, creates categories -artistic and else- in a chronology. Beaumont Newhall's³ and Naomi Rosenblum's⁴ comprehensive books are good examples to this, in which categories, taxonomies, and series of photographs from 1839 to our time are arranged according to parameters of style, subject matter, approach, intentions and needs. These books come out as valuable source for this study, whose outcome, in turn, is not an alternative to these histories. But why the photographic image is extremely slippery to evade such categories and chronology is a major concern for the theme of this writing.⁵

³See Beaumont Newhall, The History of Photography. New York: Museum of Modern Art. 1982.

⁴See Naomi Rosenblum, A World History of Photography. New York: Abbeville Press, 1984

⁵ In fact Roland Barthes points out to the same problem, that photographs are unclassifiable due to their nature. His whole quest to understand the essence of photography in Camera Lucida starts with this dilemma. This fact is, in turn, already demonstrated throughout his book with the arbitrary choice of photographs, mostly portraits, that he investigates in order to comprehend "Photography." Indeed, the 'arbitrariness' of his choice is one that can only be compared to conventional classifications. Otherwise, they are very carefully chosen in regard to the argument he builds up. This complies with his claim that in order to reach the 'fundamental nature of photography' the photographs do need to be handled one at a time: "In short, (in a photograph) the referent adheres. And this singular adherence makes it very difficult to focus on Photography: The books which deal with it.... are victims of this difficulty." (1982: 6) Barthes calls this a 'disorder'.

‘History of Photography’ in an illustrated book format, as mentioned above, induce significance and meaning on varied photographs: it contextualizes photographs under categories such as portrait, pictorial, documentary, landscape, photojournalism, scientific, etc. Some of these categories indicate an artistic style, and some simply refer to the subject matter in photographs, which Barthes calls the rhetorical category (1991: 4), while still other authors create categories in regard to the intention of the photographer (i.e. a photo-reporter) and the distribution of photographs (photojournalism).

In chronological order, these histories usually start with an array of pre-photographic techniques employing the camera obscura, and continue with daguerreotype portraits, the earliest widespread practice and technique of artistic and commercial photography. Then come the debates of the mid-nineteenth century on the validity of photography as art, mostly brought by the art establishments of the time, followed by what can be called the first pictorial phase of photography. Certain artists, notably O.G. Rejlander and H.P. Robinson, are included with illustrations, in defense of photography as art mostly through painterly subjects of the heroic, allegoric and the genre. Soon afterwards the power of image as document is discovered when French and British started taking photographs in Africa, Middle and Far East -the colonies- and notable Americans took their cameras to battlefields of Civil War and to the wilderness of the then unoccupied American West to turn in documents of public interest. Still, the content is romantic, like vast landscapes and ancient civilizations, but an ambiguity beholds the historian as to how they should be classified. In a chronological order, the histories of photography include the late nineteenth century experiments on freeze-motion photography, and other extended capacities of photographic equipment to record the subject in motion. The best articulated and

documented artistic movement in photography, that is Photo Secession as initiated by Alfred Stieglitz and others, come out in early 20th Century as the most influential motive for generations to come. Then one begins to see the shift of emphasis from Europe to United States. One view holds that as social reformers rather than revolutionaries, American photographers (notably Jacob Riis, Lewis Hine, and several others) took on the ills of society, making socially concerned photographs of the workers, the poor and the underclass in late 19th and early 20th century.⁶ The history continues with American artist-photographers, like Edward Weston and Paul Strand, with strong convictions on the art of photography, followed by photographs in print media: the widespread use of photographs in terms of photojournalism, news, entertainment and advertising, throughout late 1930's and the following two decades. To conclude, photography since mid 1950's until recent times is either marked by social events in United States, or by its integration with other art media as an alternative to painting. To note one important point, it should be said that these distinct periods of integration, both as in the historical avant-garde of Dada and Surrealism, and since Pop Art are routinely understated within the mentioned histories.

This oversimplified chronology itself points at certain problems. Throughout, one does observe anachronisms as certain photographs (not photographers) are located within a category with utmost hardship, if not arbitrarily.⁷ It is by nature of the photographic image to be shifted around, defying style, mostly apt to be classified by its subject: the photographs of this thing as opposed to photographs of that one. Thus

⁶See Naomi Rosenblum, *A World History of Photography*, Chapter 8.

⁷ To suggest that similar problems occur for a historian of painting is a relatively simple way out. What usually comes out as an exception in a chronology of especially modern painting might either be discarded as irrelevant, or else it is an early innovation. What comes up as an innovation in photography is frequently bound to its subject: a new thing or a scene that has never been photographed. In this respect, it is very illuminating to follow Sontag's investigation on how photographs expand the realm of visible and define the beautiful, in *On Photography*.

it comes as natural to encounter other histories of photography that mainly focus on one single subject in chronological order: Architecture, portrait, etc.. Just to observe that a similar attempt is rarely a concern for a historian of modern art is only one indication that photography as a form of representation is of a unique nature.

In these histories of photography, one single aspect seems to comply with, or synchronous with some chronological order, and that is the evolution of photographic technology. In no case the historian of photography could omit this evolution: it is always kept well under hand as a corollary, most often shaped into a parameter of photographic style and representation. When the cameras got smaller, the images changed, or as the films got faster the photography of motion became a norm. However plausible this sounds, it is a simplification of one kind that evades the basic understanding of photographic representation, as shall be discussed in this thesis.

Meanwhile, one photographic subject interferes with and cuts across the chronologies, styles, modes and all theories of representation, photographic and otherwise: that is, the portrait. It is by no coincidence that the critical histories of photography, if one may call it, that of Sontag, Barthes and Benjamin, pay utmost attention to portraits, outside all concerns of art and other inherent characteristics of photographic image. It is the face in the photograph that the viewer projects on, contemplates, historicise and communicates, that no other way of picturing can similarly capture. When faced with portrait photographs that he can expand on, that of Kafka, or himself as a child, or those by August Sander, Walter Benjamin poetically writes:

Immerse yourself in such a picture long enough and you will recognize how alive the contradictions are, here too: the most precise technology can give its products a magical value, such as a painted picture can never have again for us. No matter how artful the photographer, no matter how carefully posed his subject, the beholder feels an irresistible urge to search such a picture for the

tiny spark of contingency, of the Here and Now, with which reality has so to speak seared the subject, to find the inconspicuous spot where in the immediacy of that long forgotten moment the future subsists so eloquently that we, looking back, may rediscover it. For it is another nature that speaks to the camera than to the eye: other in the sense that a space informed by human consciousness gives way to a space informed by the unconscious.(1979: 243)⁸

All this brings us to another possibility for handling the photograph as artwork (i.e. a purely sociological, political, or ideological treatise) by way of isolating it from parameters of traditional art media. Put into a form of question, can there be found a uniquely intrinsic trait of photographic image that enables us to set it apart from the issue of pictorial representation as a parameter of art theory in general? This should seem plausible: after all, the photographs lent themselves to all different usage, ranging from scientific and artistic, to propaganda, and as its last resort, advertising.⁹ Within past several decades, the critics of mass media and especially commercial television have focused on what is broadly called ‘Cultural Theory’, closely incorporated with the Marxist theories, psychoanalysis and semiotics. As the majority of photographs are distributed through mass media, they are considered to be appropriate subjects for theories of culture as well. Victor Burgin, in an attempt towards establishing a definition of ‘Photography Theory’ as distinct from history or criticism states this as such:

⁸ In all three of the authors that supply the starting point for this argument, there is an evident feeling of “death” in all photographs. Sontag calls this a “pathos” of the lost and long gone, that appears in the photograph once more to the viewer. Reading these three authors, my personal observation is that they were all facing the reality of death in their lives, while contemplating on photography. Sontag’s other book that came out about the same time as *On Photography* was *Illness as Metaphor*, in which she was inspired from, and also fighting against her own illness, that is, cancer. *Camera Lucida* is the last book that Barthes wrote, in which his sympathy for his dead mother is projected to an old photograph. And Benjamin is obviously the one among them who already lived in an “apocalyptic” time of his own mind, but nevertheless induced by the coming of fascism. Mixed with religious beliefs, his reflections on ruins (everywhere) is a telling indication of the then coming catastrophe.

⁹ Alluding to scientific methodology, the possibility seems to be isolating the photographic images and putting them through an analysis with the parameters of socio-political history of past 150 years. In fact, certain efforts of re-writing art history in above terms have been attempted (as in Hadjinicolaou’s *Sanat Tarihi ve Sinif Mücadelesi*) as artworks, that is paintings of a certain period, being an effect of the history of class struggle.

What I am proposing as the *object* of theory is not restricted to photography considered as a set of techniques....; it is, rather, photography considered as a practice of *signification*. By 'practice' here is meant work on specific materials, within a specific social and historical context, and for specific purposes. The emphasis on 'signification' derives from the fact that the primary feature of photography, considered as an omnipresence in everyday social life, is its contribution to the production and dissemination of *meaning*. (1984: 2)

Indeed, language and ideology have always been involved in recent theories of art as well as culture, when representations are concerned. However, as a methodological concern for this research, a semiotics of photography poses certain problems. Even though there is a degree of insight offered by the critique of photographic image as a system of signs and signification, it falls short to account for the ways that photography intersects with the idea of art. Barthes was very much aware of this:

If we except the realm of advertising, where the meaning must be clear and distinct only by reason of its mercantile nature, the semiology of Photography is therefore limited to the admirable performances of several portraitists. For the rest, with regard to the heterogeneity of 'good' photographs, all we can say is that the *object speaks*, it induces us, vaguely, to think.... At the limit, no meaning at all is safer... (1991: 36)

Just as it is the case, many critics who in the past few decades took language as a model for photography-as-representation focus on the photographs in the service of either advertising or political propaganda.¹⁰ The problems should be apparent: even the terms to replace 'analysis' (of photographic image), that are to 'decode' or 'decipher,' allude to some sort of conspiracy, a hidden (and hideous) intent against masses either in advertising or propaganda through mass media. Obviously there is truth in this; it is an ideological matter, or more precisely, some ideology produce and distribute majority of photographs that need to be fought against or, by the same token

¹⁰ Victor Burgin, "Photographic Practice and Art Theory", in Thinking Photography. One should also note here that one of the most widely debated topics of the past three decades involves advertising, feminist theory and representations of women in media. In fact, this not only happens on theoretical level, since a rapidly increasing number of the women artists working with photography confront the issues through their work.

praised, but in any case their meaning to be deciphered in order to be neutralized. The problem lies in the deficiencies of this decoding system to account for the ways that art operates, to point out the instances that photographs signify the idea of art. To suggest that the photograph has no syntax is only a minor point to defy the field of semiotics, to render it as irrelevant for the purpose of this thesis. More important is to accept that art operates in a rather neutral field, sometimes totally indifferent with no value as utility, and what makes it ideological (i.e. political) works in a more complex way than that of either propaganda or advertising. Photography since its beginnings is the best testament to this, the photographs with the strongest ideological and aesthetic convictions now gone into oblivion. In respect to the field of semiotics and photography, the two decades that separate two of Barthes's writings is very illuminating. Unlike what was quoted above, that is the limited scope of semiology in the analysis of the photograph, two decades earlier one finds him to be a lot more enthusiastic to apply a linguistic terminology to the photographic messages.¹¹

Thus the sources for this research are the ones that concern the nature of photographic images in terms of their specific characters as distinct from traditional media (like Sontag's, Barthes' and Benjamin's as mentioned above) and their complementary theories that investigate the transformations of this nature in the digital

¹¹ In 1961 in an essay titled "The Photographic Message" Roland Barthes set out what he calls the 'Photographic Paradox' as the simultaneous existence of denotative and connotative messages in the photographs: "...What does the photograph transmit? By definition the scene itself, the literal reality. From the object to its image there is of course a reduction -in proportion, perspective, color- but at no time is this reduction a *transformation* (in the mathematical sense of the term). In order to move from the reality to its photograph it is in no way necessary to divide up this reality into units and to constitute these units as signs, substantially different from the object they communicate...." Up to here, this 'perfect analogon of reality' seems to pose no contradiction with what he writes in 'Camera Lucida'. But as Barthes writes further, the possibilities of the connoted messages in the photograph become apparent: "... The photographic paradox can be seen as the co-existence of the two messages, the one without a code (the photographic analogue), the other with a code (The 'art', or treatment, or the 'writing', or the rhetoric, of the photograph); structurally, the paradox is clearly not the collusion of a denoted message and a connoted message.... it is that here the connoted (or coded) message develops on the basis of a message *without a code*. ..." See "The Photographic Message" in Photography in Print, Vicki Goldberg, ed.

domain, as will be handled in the conclusion. The methodology involves an analysis of the photographic image in regard to parameters of art, as they evolve in the past one and a half century. In this case, visual representation as the basis of art theory is taken to be the prime parameter in order to understand how photographs are contextualized as art. The difference between the terms 'pictorial representation' (which refers to making of a picture in terms of shape, form, depth and the like, and mostly engages sensory perception) and 'visual representation' (which engages a broader reception including the cognitive, political and ideological) should be taken into account throughout the text. On the other hand, one confusing aspect of the relationship between photography and art involves the passing of time and should somehow be handled with caution in this investigation. Complementary to the claim that photographs are mute surfaces lending themselves to varied sorts of uses through different channels of distribution and contextualization, the distance in time also helps elevating photographs to the realm of art. As an artifact repositioned by publications and museums-galleries, that is by an authority, the image and, symbolically, the content of the past is preserved as an artwork of archaeological importance.¹²

The photograph beautifies; it turns everything that it records into beautiful images. In one way, Susan Sontag's On Photography is mainly dedicated to show how this is established, how the photograph looks more beautiful than mere reality of its origin. One of the distinctions between the intentions of an amateur photographer and the photographer as an artist is given as such: for an amateur, the photograph of a beautiful thing or a scene (i.e. a sunset) is a beautiful photograph. Contrary to this, the

¹² Sontag comments on this point: "The particular qualities and intentions of photographs tend to be swallowed up in the generalized pathos of time past. Aesthetic distance seems built into the very experience of looking at photographs. if not right away, then certainly with the passage of time. Time eventually positions most photographs, even the most amateurish, at the level of art." (1978: 21)

course of modern art, closely knitted together with photographic images, is a series of attempts to show that anything can be beautiful when pictured. This detachment from what can be called 'content' is the main issue faced by the critics of modern art.

Evidently it became the inherent logic of picturing the world, the means of pictorial representation that is left for articulation. In the meantime, photographs seem to be left out of the field of aesthetics as the naming of the beautiful, or judged in regard to painting, and as such, evading their inherent nature in modern times. Sontag comments:

Initially judged by the norms of painting, which assumes conscious design and the elimination of non essentials, the distinctive achievements of photographic seeing were until quite recently thought to be identical with the work of that relatively small number of photographers who, through reflection and effort, managed to transcend the camera's mechanical nature to meet the standards of art. But it is now clear that there is no inherent conflict between the mechanical or naive use of the camera, and a formal beauty of a very high order, no kind of photograph in which such beauty could not turn out to be present. (1978: 103)

Meanwhile, a certain aspect of visual representation challenges the contextualization of the photographic image as art. Within the modern conception of art theory, as in Gombrich, the issue of an evolution (in the sense that all art owes more to the previous artworks, than they do to nature) holds a strong place. This can be handled in different ways. One is the evolution in the systematics of image making, for example the construction of a two dimensional image out of the reality of space around us. In this respect, the introduction of linear perspective came out as a giant leap to the scene, but then, the historical distribution of this evolution is anything but even or gradual. In fact the problem lies in the decision to reconcile the photograph with this kind of an evolutionary view. On one hand, it is true that what we perceive as improvements come out of certain necessities, in close connection with discoveries in natural sciences. Meanwhile, the long and stalled periods in this evolutionary outlook

have a lot to do with another necessity of non-aesthetic sort, that is, the need to convey the required narrative. In other words, there is a story to be told and there are proven methods of picturing it. What Gombrich calls 'schemas', which eventually lead to changes in artistic style, are the outcome of the function of art within a given cultural context. When photography is concerned, it looks apparent that one is faced by another quantum leap in regard to what constitutes reality. As a medium in between the observer and the physical world, that is in between the observing subject and the object, photography is long assumed to have altered the sequential schemas of traditional images and art.

In connection with this, the idea that the accuracy in resemblance yields a more realistic style of art has to be reconsidered. Though, the cultural context observed in retrospect as belonging to a specific group or society, is a function of varied determinants that pose a major problem to a historian. But nevertheless, the more or less generalized episteme of the western world as laid out by Michel Foucault forms the first step towards understanding the nature of visual representations.¹³ A variant of this argument is the fact that photographic images did play a role to transform this episteme, but by their specific nature they were not 'shaped' by the cultural function ascribed to visual representations. In other words, no schemas were involved in making photographs, albeit the ones employed by traditional images were adopted by photographers. In this respect, the first part of this study is reserved for a study of a number of concepts that were widely regarded as essential to art theory.

In this research, the intersection of these representational issues in between the domain of art in general and that of the photographic image is considered to be made up of the following: mimesis, perspective, movement and abstraction. While

¹³ Michel Foucault's The Order of Things (1970) is taken to be the prime source to found an argument on representation as a general term.

apparently a subjective set of parameters, one should note that they constituted the crucial interaction in between the traditional images of art and that of photography. But the reasons why these parameters cannot completely be carried over to our time to render photographs artistic is also just as crucial for this research. The issue is not only that they are no longer as strongly relevant as they used to be in art theory, but also epistemologically, the reality that these parameters indicate is considered to be long replaced by another in the times we are living.

For the purposes of this study, the other kind of 'realism' of the artwork that is primarily established through photography (instead of traditional images) is handled under the heading 'Art as Photography.' Thus, unlike the aesthetic parameters as, say, mimesis, the issues discussed under this heading concern either the techniques or strategies such as montage, art as concept and typology. Eventually, the ontological questions on the artwork posed by the readymade is found to be crucial when art as concept is to include the photographic. However, in no case these parameters are bound to an exact chronological order in recent history of art. For example, as will be discussed, the problematics of montage as regards the early avant-garde art of this century, will crucially surface once more in the digital realm. And this brings us to the concluding argument of the study, that is relationship of the idea of art and photography in the age of computers.

1. Representation and Its Boundaries

At the very basis of a definition of representation, lies the concept of order. Simply put, it is order that enables man to comprehend the world, to be able to represent it, to himself and others in return; "...that which is given in things as their inner law, the hidden network that determines the way they confront one another, and also that which has no existence except in the grid created by a glance, an examination, a language..." (Foucault, 1970: xx) As a general term, representation covers a wide range of expressions, or 'signatures.' Order, and thus the possibility for representation, involves a series of classifications of things and phenomena, through certain relations, and, most importantly, resemblances. As described by Foucault, the epistemological history of western world, its systems of classifications and ordering had shown a continuous path since antiquity, until 17th Century. Within this classical epistemology, as the author names it, resemblances, and especially 'analogy' as a type of resemblance, stand out as the basis of systematics, of understanding the world with visible and invisible relations. Analogy, in this case, works not only on resemblance of things, but also on resemblance of relations among things. Within this process of acquiring of the knowledge, Foucault writes, it is the signature, or, the 'sign' that makes the resemblance visible: "The world of similarity can only be a world of signs... The sign of affinity, and what renders it visible, is quite simply analogy; the cipher of sympathy resides in proportion." (1970: 27-8) And this, what he calls the sixteenth century episteme, is poverty stricken because

Resemblance never remains stable within itself; it can be fixed only if it refers back to another similitude, which then, in turn, refers to others; each resemblance, therefore, has value only from the accumulation of all the others, and the whole world must be explored if even the slightest of analogies is to be justified and finally take on the appearance of certainty. (1970: 30)

The above hardship, that is to wholly understand things and phenomena through resemblances, leads him to conclude that it is the microcosm as the model of the universe that guaranteed the contained and finite set of affinities among things. In this episteme, the representative content of language had no role to play, but language -syllables, words, syntax- was just as itself to be studied 'as a thing in nature.'

At this point in analysis, representation through language, or more to the point, the resemblance of words to the things they depict should be taken into account, for at the basis of representation of any kind, including the pictorial, lies the same problematic. To Foucault, the threshold of modern epistemology arrives at the end of sixteenth century, when "...the peculiar existence and ancient solidity of language as a thing inscribed in the fabric of the world were dissolved in the functioning of representation: all language had value only as discourse." (1970: 43) To put it another way, certain theories of pictorial representation put forth the arbitrary link from the picture to the world, analogous with arbitrariness of the link between the words and the objects they designate. This view, categorized as 'pictorial relativism' maintains that the problem of realism in pictorial representations is one to be resolved not by 'imitation' or 'copy' theory, but by the realism within the symbol system that establishes this link.¹⁴ Thus being constructed mainly as a cultural convention that determines the 'rightness' of the symbol system, nature in turn becomes a product of art and discourse. This marks the beginning of analysis of meaning and signification, in

¹⁴ Brian G Conley, Theories of Pictorial Representation. Conley considers Nelson Goodman to be the foremost theoretician of this view.

which “the sign ceases to be a form of the world; and it ceases to be bound to what it marks by the solid and secret bonds of resemblance or affinity” (Foucault, 1970: 58)

In a general account, theories of visual representation emerge as the investigation of realism in the artwork, as the term ‘realism’ referring to a generalized idea. The major devices of achieving realism in this way are illusion and symbol, as polarized concepts. When the reality of representation is taken as an outcome of a likeness or a similarity to the depicted, an illusion is considered to be taking place. Whether it is an illusion of a three dimensional space and objects within it, or an illusion of a likeness (i.e. physiognomic), a picture is regarded to be a realistic representation through resemblance. Whereas when pictures are taken as symbols that are used to refer to objects, as Nelson Goodman maintains, realism is a psychological phenomenon that occurs to symbols as a system within a culture.¹⁵ “Because of this any picture can in principle be a realistic picture of anything so long as the picture is assigned to the object within the most familiar representational system within the culture” (Conley, 1985: 5) In any case, the mode of representation provides the first step in understanding art and photographic images as well.

However, to quote Foucault for the fundamental argument concerning the condition of representations and to further it for an object’s status as an artwork, is to initially exclude theories of aesthetics that governed fine arts for a long time, most notably that of Immanuel Kant. This rather complex situation is not exactly one of a binary opposition, completely cancelling each other: when Kant writes on the ‘disinterested’ satisfaction that determines the judgement of taste, or, on the universality of it, this does indeed support certain arguments in this research that claim similar conditions for the artwork to be totally free from a practical mission, as a

¹⁵ See Nelson Goodman, The Languages of Art.

unique object that may or may not be judged on empirical grounds, and thus giving it the highest privileged status among other representations, scientific or else. But however, specifically when photography is concerned, Kant's aesthetics contradicts many of the contexts that photographs are used for artistic production. Indeed the very first contradiction rests in Kant's statement that the judgement of taste is not based on concepts, but it is purely aesthetical. That is, any representation's status as art does not reside on cognitive grounds. (1964: 280) The issue is not as simple as to claim that all photographs are perceived, or better, appreciated on a purely cognitive level due to their special and causal relation with the physical world, or that 'art as concept' is more appropriate today than a kind of 'formalism'. More importantly, as this research will attempt to show, the epistemological and ontological grounds for art, and artworks with photographs, have been transformed radically not to fit in the aesthetical categories as such. In fact, Foucault's interpretation of Las Meninas or of Magritte's paintings can be the telling instances where differences become clearly apparent, where the judgement of taste gives way to an articulation of concepts and the work is worthy of an art status on the basis of this articulation. But in order not to stress a cancellation in between the two as stated above, an interpretation of a key point in Kant's aesthetics becomes important. In 'Critique of the Aesthetical Judgement', Kant, in a very clear way, writes on the conditions of judgement of taste, to come to the following conclusion regarding the aesthetical idea:

...by an aesthetical idea I understand that representation of the imagination which occasions much thought, without however any definite thought, i.e. any *concept*, being capable of being adequate to it; it consequently cannot be completely compassed and made intelligible by language. We easily see that it is the counterpart (pendant) of a *rational idea*, which conversely is a concept to which no *intuition* (or representation of the imagination) can be adequate. (1964: 318)

The importance of the above lies primarily in the sovereignty given to the artwork, as that cannot be translated into language. Although Kant is mostly interpreted as predominantly the founder of modern formalism (Hofstadter and Kuhns, 1964: 279), the complex articulation of his writings offer insights to understand the legitimate grounds for art even today, and parts, in its own way, representation in general from the aesthetical.

The very basis of the claim that separates photography and traditional images in terms of representation, also supplies the link between aesthetics and representation. Mostly derived from Kant, this separation maintains that painting stands in a certain 'intentional' relation to its subject, whereas in photography this relation is 'causal' due to the fact that the photograph is always an image of something that actually exists. And aesthetic interest, which in turn refers to art, first and foremost is to be based on the former, that is, on the intention of representation:

The painting stands in this intentional relation to its subject because of a representational act, the artist's act, and in characterizing the relation between a painting and its subject we are also describing the artist's intention.....The interest is not in representation for the sake of its subject but in representation for its own sake. And it is such an interest that forms the core of the aesthetic experience of pictorial art... (Scruton, 1983: 110)

Consequently, the important trait that determines photographic representation is causality. Then, in fact, the object of interest is the object that the photograph shows, instead of representation itself: "With an ideal photograph it is neither necessary nor even possible that the photographer's intention should enter as a serious factor in determining how the picture is seen. It is recognized at once for what it is..." (Scruton, 1983: 111) This view thus maintains that the 'history of the art of photography' had always been a field of successive attempts to break this causality, to introduce human intention into making of photographs in order to elevate it to the

realm of representational arts. In this case , ‘understanding’ an artwork is to understand ‘a thought embodied in perceptual form.’¹⁶

Otherwise, it appears to be evident that photographs represent by resemblance. Furthermore, any argument on the ‘degree’ of resemblance that concerns all traditional modes of pictorial representations come out as irrelevant to photographic images, because photographs, since the beginning, are considered to be a trace of the things they visually represent, supplying a direct link between representation and reality. Thus, any articulation on cultural conventions that govern representation as a whole, or any attempt to take a photograph apart to its bare elements in order to reconstruct the path of representation (as in language) appears to be useless. But nevertheless, one can talk about the ‘indexical’ character of photographic images as such: the photograph may ‘point at’ a certain concept or phenomenon. Frequently, this function of the photograph is referred to as ‘representation as’, and it is usually associated with fiction. In other words, the photograph can be a second degree representation, that is, a photograph of a thing (or a scene, or a person) representing something else. In fact, this is one of the common ways that photography is contextualized as art all throughout its history.

However, in order to better comprehend how photography transformed the concept of representation by introducing a new ways of acquiring knowledge, and a new mode of representation, one has to look into representational issues from the other way around, as emerging from the photographic image itself . Sontag comments:

¹⁶ While not untrue, this approach organize the problematics of art around aesthetic experience derived from traditional images and puts them into use without any credit given to the specifics of the photographic image, and thus defines artistic activity and value within the parameters long been questioned and superceded. Furthermore, with its emphasis on the cult of the artist’s genius and the craft of image making, it is deprived of the possibilities to pose serious questions regarding the ontological grounds of the artwork in our times.

A new sense of the notion of information has been constructed around the photographic image. The photograph is a thin slice of space as well as time. In a world ruled by photographic images, all borders ("framing") seem arbitrary. Anything can be separated, can be made discontinuous, from anything else..... Through photographs, the world becomes a series of unrelated, freestanding particles; and history, past and present, a set of anecdotes... The camera makes reality atomic, manageable, and opaque. (1978: 22-23)

One may understand that with the photographic image the issues take on a new turn where one is confronted with a kind of ambiguity regarding the nature of representations. Foucault tells of an 'empirical order' that is established by cultural codes which govern language, perception, exchanges and, in turn, representations (1970: xx), while Sontag writes on a new notion of information. They both direct one away from the aesthetical in the Kantian sense which suppose an a priori judgement of taste, untainted by empirical knowledge. Indeed photographs had always taken a role in between the empirical and purely aesthetical, evading the borders of the two. Thus, what kind of an understanding of the term 'representation', (as related to photography) is apt to be labeled as art becomes the major problem.

2. Issues of Representation in Photography as Art

Just as painting has no identity until it is brought into the history of painting, the history of painting must be returned to the theory of which it is a paradigm of linguistic community. Art histories are examples of theories of cognition, and in that sense all art history has been commentary on the status of representation. Theory is always the elaboration of a cultural stubbornness concerning things in the world and how we determine their value... (Steiner, 1992: 62)

The notion of 'representation' plays a central role in investigations for understanding the process of art. When the term is further specified as 'visual representation', the investigations focus mainly on painting through the history of art. In return, for purposes of this study, the flat surfaces that carry the different modes of representation -be it a painting, a drawing or a photograph- are of primary importance. After the introduction of photography in 1839 and until the end of the nineteenth century, there had been varying responses from artists and especially painters to the photographic images. Even though the responses, especially from the established institutions in England and France, were mostly negative, almost everyone within or around the artistic realm had something to say about photography. Moreover, artists ranging from Delacroix to Ingres and to Impressionists have made some use of photographs, even when they rejected the new medium as a branch of fine arts. The accepted norms of painting that favored a brand of naturalism, mostly dictated by Académie des Beaux-Arts in Paris and Royal Academy in England, were held against and incommensurable with what came out of photographs visually. One common belief among the artistic elite was that photography should be in service of

the artist-painter as a reservoir of realistic images from visible world and, as in Baudelaire's words, "It must return to its real task, which is to be the servant of the sciences and of the arts, but the very humble servant, like printing and shorthand which have neither created nor supplanted literature." Indeed, Baudelaire's idea was that poetry and photography were irreconcilable in the sense that poetry is the essence of art, and, of painting:

Poetry and progress are two ambitious creatures who hate each other instinctively. And when they meet on the same road, one of the two must give way to the other. If photography is allowed to stand in for art in some of its functions it will soon supplant or corrupt it completely thanks to the natural support it will find in the stupidity of the multitude... (1981: 125)

Taken as a forecast from an influential thinker on the arts, the above can be seen as an attempt to maintain a higher status for painting as opposed to emerging possibilities in mass production, not only of goods but also of potential works of art as well. To better understand this mid-19th century order regarding art, one should bear in mind that it was again Kant who gave the very first place to poetry among all the arts. Indeed one should also suppose that 'poetry' in this sense is to encompass more than the mere practice it brings to mind, just as Baudelaire suggests, and that its connotations apply to all fine arts, praising artworks of high order. In Kant's words,

Of all the arts *poetry* maintains the first rank. It expands the mind by setting the imagination at liberty and by offering, within the limits of a given concept, amid the unbounded variety of possible forms according therewith, that which unites the presentment of this concept with a wealth of thought to which no verbal expression is adequate, and so rising aesthetically to ideas. (1964: 327)

To carry the same argument into recent times, Gombrich stresses the importance of the 'stuff of poetry':

Long before painting achieved the means of illusion, man was aware of ambiguities in the visual field and had learned to describe them in language. Similes, metaphors, the stuff of poetry no less than of myth, testify to the powers of the creative mind to create and dissolve new classifications. It is the unpractical man, the dreamer whose response may be less rigid and less sure

than that of his more efficient fellow, who taught us the possibility of seeing a rock as a bull and perhaps a bull as a rock. (1986: 313)

Apart from the purely poetical, through non-official channels, painting and photography have strongly influenced and looked into one another as far as visual representation is concerned. Until the appearance of the photo-collage as a new possibility for the avant-garde in late 1910's, the series of interactions between the two media and the possibilities of photographs to become art can be analyzed within the following parameters.

2.1 Mimesis

Indeed, the very first approach to understand the meaning of representation goes through the concept of 'mimesis,' something that does not seem to be dictated only for a chronological convenience. Upon reflection, this idea of 'imitation of nature' may possibly considered to be the starting point on which the mankind first thought of the nature of artwork per se. However, within the limited scope of this writing, only some aspects, or better, interpretations of the term will suffice, rather than an historical overview since The Republic.¹⁷ Andrew Benjamin articulates the issue with an analogy to a 'mirror':

The mirror brings with it the history of reflection. A vital part of that history has been the antagonism constructed by philosophy for art; this antagonism is encountered within, if not as, mimesis. The visual arts have always been ,

¹⁷ Most accounts of mimesis regarding arts, and especially painting, start with Book Ten of Plato's The Republic. What should be stated here as of considerable interest is certain interpretations of The Republic regarding imitation through language as well, that is the relation in between the name and the named. Very much supportive of what Foucault labels as the 'classical episteme', Walter Benjamin writes on the historical development of the concept in "On the Mimetic Faculty" in One Way Street and sets out the instances where language is directly involved.

from within the terms set by this particular philosophical tradition, struggling with an ideal type that can never be fulfilled. The mirror is from the start conceded as an impossibility. And yet it positions art within an equally impossible situation. Mimesis, representation and the figurative do at the same time acknowledge the ideal and its impossibility. (1991: 2)

One of the apparent features of the imitation theory is the importance that it gives to the transparency of the medium of representation. For any kind of illusion of reality through mimetic representation, the medium should itself be invisible, that is, be not conscious of its own properties. Arthur Danto states that this situation is perfectly symbolized by a pane of glass

...which is presumed transparent, something we cannot see but only see through (as consciousness is transparent in the respect that we are not conscious of it but only of its objects.) If the pane of glass were not a means, it would be a metaphor for mimetic representation... The successful imitator does not merely reproduce the motif; he sublates the medium in which the reproduction occurs. (1981: 151)

Similarly, the photographic image as a transparency in literal and metaphoric sense complies with the above. The transparency is the pane of glass (the film) through which the world is observed and on which it is rendered. Sontag, in a comparison of traditional art media states this as such: "While a painting or a prose description can never be other than a narrowly selective interpretation, a photograph can be treated as a narrowly selected transparency." (1978: 6)¹⁸ It is not by chance that mirrors and windows are also the metaphors for the classification of photographs in artistic milieu, as the photographers either look towards an outer reality through the window, or observe themselves in the mirror.¹⁹

¹⁸ The apparatus within the photographic program today, as Flusser suggests, works similarly to hide its complexities to render the medium invisible. When taking photographs becomes a 'nature,' the apparatus becomes more complex in technical terms to support the ease of its operation. The demonstration of this phenomenon comes out through advertising for cameras, which repeatedly present them as the natural component of human body, an extension of the eye with the ergonomic features offered for the ease of operation by hand. Or, as a second nature, a fully automated process that sees for you, but in obedience. For related argument see Vilém Flusser, Towards a Philosophy of Photography.

¹⁹ See John Szarkowski, Mirrors and Windows, New York: MoMA, 1968.

The relation of the photographic image with the wider concept of mimesis, however, is not one to be resolved as simple as it seems. Art theory had always involved an investigation of imitations, or the ‘reflections of reality’ to which photography replied with the reflections of appearances, true to its origins, but as real as the appearances themselves. So in the shallow field of the surfaces, photographs seldom attained the credibility of ‘truth’ in the philosophical sense, ie. as that manifests itself in the artwork. When they were thought to be ‘like nature’, as Kant expected the true artwork to be, this was a kind of cover-up, or it signified a naturalization of their reception, their transparency.

2.2 Physiognomic Likeness: Portrait in Photography

The anthropomorphic likeness of the photographic process had always been a common view in which the photographic lens corresponds to the lens in the eye, the diaphragm to the iris, and the photographic film to the retina. Even further, red, green and blue sensitive layers of the color film seem to be modeled after the RGB sensitive receptors among rods and cones. On one level (perhaps metaphorically), these similarities form the basis of truth of the photographic image: “Unlike any other visual image, a photograph is not a rendering, an imitation or an interpretation of its subject, but actually a trace of it. No painting or drawing, however naturalist, belongs to its subject in the way that a photograph does.” (Sontag, 1978:120) This understanding constitutes the cult value of portrait photograph, the ‘death mask’ as Sontag calls it.

Commercial portraiture was the very first field that photography took over very rapidly in the first several decades. Among the first practitioners of the new

medium were portrait painters and miniaturists, but, eventually, the majority of them who tried to continue their craft in the traditional way after photography, were either forced out of their occupation for economic reasons, or found new outlets for their craft, like coloring daguerreotype portraits. Commercially, photographs were more affordable for general public and the statistics show that 100.000 daguerreotype portraits were made in Paris alone in 1849. (Scharf, 1983: 41) . Outside the commercial field that borders on a kind of 'industry', among the first established artists to make use of daguerreotype portraits in paintings was Ingres, sometimes by directly painting from photographs:

Ingres's early portrait paintings,.... are distinctly different in color from those executed after his return from Rome. In the first group the colors are cool and delicately tint the refined surfaces of the porcelain-like figures. But in portraits after about 1841, they become warm and metallic, and as closely approximate to the hues of coloured daguerreotype plates as they do to the fine precision with which this type of photograph described textured surfaces.....One might reasonably characterize these later portraits as 'enlarged daguerreotypes'.. (Scharf, 1983: 50)

In fact, there had been a number of evidences showing that the photographic portrait had a strong influence on painting at the time, by a large number of painters. These range from the pose that the sitters take, (usually the hand supporting the head during the relatively long exposure time, or a rather stiff look due to the mechanism of braces and head supports), to the correction of left-right reversal in self portraits, which were previously done from mirror images; and most importantly, to the sharp tonal differences in color, suggesting a transference from high contrast black and white images.²⁰

²⁰ All throughout the history of the photographic image, the tonal gradation in B&W have been a major technical problem, and especially in early years before the introduction of panchromatic emulsions, the unusual rendering of certain colors in tones of gray, and higher contrast had its traces observed in painting. Even though this may not explain the photographic light, color and tone in certain earlier paintings, nevertheless it does help explain, for example, the fall-off in illumination on faces in the nineteenth century portraits.

When taken as an analogue of the physiognomic features of the person, the portrait photograph poses further problems in terms of representation:

The portrait photograph exists within a series of seemingly endless paradoxes. Indeed, as the formal representation of a face or body it is, by its very nature, enigmatic. And part of this enigma is imbedded in the nature of identity as itself ambiguous, for the portrait advertises an individual who endlessly eludes the single, static and fixed frame of a public portrait. (Clarke, 1992: 1)

By now, it appears that a dialogue of one sort between photography and painting in most of nineteenth century was about the supposed 'realism' that is conveyed in images by both media. In terms of photography, this issue was to be a matter of sharp and soft focus images, especially in portraits. Within the vague and non-standardized state of photographic technology, as told by historians, the details sharply rendered or subdued in photographs seem to be as much a matter of choice for photographers, as being dictated by technical matters. In this respect, two different camps emerge after a relatively broad generalization: The sharp focus images in England and softer ones in France. (Scharf, 1983: 77) As a result, an effortless deduction from this dialogue can be about the issue of poetry, alluding to Baudelaire, achieved in photography by the rendering of soft contours in soft focus images. Indeed, it is not clear that by this way the photographic line was mimicking the brush, and thus the painting as art. Nevertheless, this feature was to make its way well into the beginning of twentieth century, into what can be called the second phase of pictorial photography.

Another important issue in comparison of photographic portraits and those of paintings involves the time in the making. In other words, photographic portraits are mostly considered to depict the temporal expressions of the sitters, while the painter spends an incomparably longer time in order to find and execute the true expression that characterize the person. Indeed this view is plausible when the best of the painted

portraits are concerned through the history of art. But Walter Benjamin objects to this with what he calls 'the optical unconscious' revealed in photographs. Used as a general characteristic of the photographic, especially in regard to details, this is explained as such:

It is through photography that we first discover the existence of this optical unconscious, just as we discover the instinctual unconscious through psychoanalysis.... Yet at the same time photography reveals in this material the physiognomic aspects of visual worlds which dwell in the smallest things, meaningful yet covert enough to find a hiding place in waking dreams, enlarged and capable of formulation, make the difference between technology and magic visible as a thoroughly historical variable. (1979: 245)

Through these, it is easy to realize, once more, how elusive is the portrait photograph, while at the same time it is most commonly used to validate identity, just like a signature, an authentication of existence. The optical unconscious, as told by Benjamin, bears resemblances with what Barthes calls the 'punctum': "...because the photographs I am speaking of are in effect punctuated, sometimes even speckled with these sensitive points; precisely, these marks, these wounds are so many *points*... I shall therefore call *punctum*..." (1980: 26) Disturbing the 'studium', that cultural frame of reference for reading photographs and especially the portraits, for Barthes the punctum mostly appear in details much similar to the slip of the tongue, and deserves special attention, makes the image enigmatic. Furthermore, on personal basis, Barthes writes about how he 'constitutes' himself in front of the camera by posing, and thus, how his body is incapable of finding its 'zero degree' in the photograph, doomed 'always to have an expression'. To him, photography always turns the subject into an object :

To see oneself (differently from in a mirror): on the scale of History, this action is recent, the painted, drawn, or miniaturized portrait having been , until the spread of photography, a limited possession, intended moreover to advertise a social and financial status.... Odd that no one has thought of the *disturbance* (to civilization) which this new action causes. I want a History of

Looking. For the Photograph is the advent of myself as other: a cunning dissociation of consciousness from identity. (1980: 12)

As stated in the introduction, the portrait in photography always escapes classifications, establishing an independent region through which the theories of art and representation slip by. One can well assume that this is another unique characteristic of the photographic image, however slightly different from those of reproducibility, instantaneity, temporality and else. In this instance, just as it does for the History of Photography, the portrait poses problems for this research as well. To reduce the portrait photograph to an object of analysis for political-ideological representations, as the theories of media frequently does, is to bypass the broader question of art. It is true that portraits are often contextualized within the realm of art, but however, this fictional-intentional use is always emphasized through the context (and even masqueraded in recent times), to counter-balance the ‘sincerety’ and the ‘vision’ in the gaze of the political figure (and in that of the model in an advertising) that one encounters in mass media.

2.3 Perspective and its Significance

“The history of naturalism in art from the Greeks to the impressionists is the history of a most successful experiment, the real discovery of appearances.”
(Gombrich, 1986: 326)

This section is devoted to the study of evolution of linear perspective as the representation of space, its connections to tradition and the role of vision in art, and ultimately to its relation with photographic-optical devices and photographic image.

The claim is that the perspective construction of space is not merely a tool for making more realistic images, but also a determinant, and ultimately a philosophical component of comprehending the world we live in: That is, a world view. This view, although altered in art terms since the beginning of the twentieth century, will help better to understand the nature of photographic images, and, perhaps, to find a new role for it. For purposes of this research, a brief survey of chronology will suffice to obtain an historical outlook.

Willi Bartschi, after a short outline of the characteristics of Pre-Greek art, clearly points out that Greeks invented the perspective drawing in the sixth century B.C., and that, minor exceptions aside, a historical gap of its use follows until the rediscovery of perspective construction in the fifteenth century.(1981: 8) Indeed, here the author is mentioning the proper rules of linear perspective, rather than approximations in representing the third dimension. The earliest examples are those found on Greek vases, as perspective foreshortening of figures, but, importantly, lacking the element of a fixed standpoint which happens to be of utmost significance for the present study. In other words: "...Every single figure appears in its own perspective without relation to the whole and to the space."(1981: 9) In fact, the above mentioned view of the world does presuppose the fixed point (the eye) for, first, construction of perspective space (linear perspective), and then the placement of figures and objects within this constructed space (free perspective): "Linear perspective is based on 'central projection,' in which the visual or projection rays converge in a central point or, conversely, radiate from it. This point, called the center of projection, is, as it were, the single eye of linear perspective" (Bartschi, 1981: 34). Through this historical outlook, the perspective representation of space first appear in wall paintings of Greek colonies in Italy, notably in Pompei. Perhaps not very

surprisingly, the Greek-derived word 'Scenography' for perspective actually means 'stage setting' and, it is a part of optics that concerns how buildings must be reproduced in painting, characteristic of the wings of Greek theater.(Bartschi, 1981: 9).

On the other hand, Peter Galassi points at the manipulations of perspective system by artists as a kind of progression in a coherent history that he labels as 'the role of vision in art'(1981: 13). Without doubt, the perspective construction of space as the effect of a specific viewpoint and a particular moment in time, has its basis in the general framework of history of western thought since Renaissance, especially as it relates to 'the order of the world.' How the vision in art, and in turn the 'normative visual scheme' had foreseen the coming of photographic image is Galassi's most important argument. Based on examples from landscape paintings and sketches from roughly the seventeenth to the end of the nineteenth century, Before Photography is a refutation of the widely accepted theory that photography caused the art of painting to distance itself from a mimetic representation, and ultimately, ending in the destruction of perspective space. On the contrary, the study shows that the eye at the top of the visual pyramid of perspective started to play an active, decisive role well before photography became possible, and thus foresaw the fragmentary, analytical nature of photographic image:

Ever since Leon Battista Alberti published *On Painting* in 1435, a perspective picture has been defined as a plane intersecting the pyramid of vision. At the apex of the pyramid is the eye. The pyramid's base is the perimeter of the picture. The picture is the projection upon intersecting plane of everything that lies within the scope of the pyramid.. (Galassi, 1981: 16)

This phenomenon, while alluding to the gesture of photographing, also enables Galassi to make a distinction between two polar conceptions of perspective: to work from pieces to a whole; to synthesize, and, to work from a whole to an aspect; to

analyse. The landscape painter, with his sketch, analysed as did the photographer who was unable to 'compose' the picture (like a Renaissance painter), but could only 'take' it. Thus, here one can speak of the photographic perception of the world and can see how it is different from the preordained perspective space of the Renaissance artist, in other words, as already a given instead of being constructed by the artist. The visible world offers an unlimited number of fragmentary appearances for the photographer to eliminate, choose from, select and then to capture in a specific time and space, but not to compose. It is a fragmented view of the world, as far as 'vision' is taken as encompassing both perception and consciousness. However, one may think of the dialectical logic of photographic image as in line with the photographic perception of the world, a literal actuality in regard to time and space: the eidetic faculty of the photographic image as the record of interrelationships between things of the visual realm. Galassi comments:

Photography recorded not the physical reality before the lens but its visible aspect, determined by a specific point and scope of view, at a particular moment, in a particular light. The description was seamless, but only in two dimensions. The photographer ignored this fact at his peril, risking obstructions and discontinuities, fortuitous juxtapositions, and unexpected densities and gaps in spatial logic. (1981: 29)

When 'vision' is concerned, perspective takes on metaphorical significance as well: ".....(central projection) entails the representation of objects and their relations in the field of view from a single and fixed point of view. Central projection implies subordination of the objects to a whole, the primacy of the whole over its parts, reference of the whole to the observer, who is thereby included in the picture...." (Bartschi, 1981: 10) The whole process has one implication: The individual at the center of the world. No wonder since Renaissance, pictorial representation had been

handled in terms of naturalism, a proximity to what is perceived, together with the cult of the artist, the 'eye' on the world. According to Victor Burgin:

The signifying system of photography, like that of classical painting, at once depicts a scene *and the gaze of the spectator*, an object *and* a viewing subject. The two dimensional analogical signs of photography are formed within an apparatus which is essentially that of the *camera obscura* of the Renaissance. Whatever the object depicted, the manner of its depiction accords with laws of geometric projection which imply a unique 'point of view'. It is the position of point-of-view, occupied in fact by the camera, which is bestowed upon the spectator. To the point-of-view, the system of representation adds the *frame* (an inheritance which may be traced through easel painting, via mural painting, to its origin in the convention of post and lintel architectural construction); through the agency of the frame the world is organized into a coherence which it actually lacks, into a parade of tableaux, a succession of 'decisive moments'. (1984: 146)

While the photographic image fully complies with the rules of linear perspective (in fact, since camera obscura) one should take caution in easily accepting that it has taken up the role of vision in art, as laid out by Galassi and others. The very fact that the central projection is based on the dominance of the whole over the parts due to the fixed viewpoint, indicates the synthetic order observed in Renaissance painting, favoring a balanced, frontal and symmetrical arrangement of perspective space. In other words, the perspective space is constructed first, and then the figures take their place in relation to this space. The grid usually came into use to indicate the depth of space: "....Renaissance painters liked to suggest depth through the rendering of tiled pavements. Assuming as we must that the pavements are flat and the tiles identical units, we are compelled to read their progressive diminution as recession." (Gombrich, 1986: 261) The whole process presupposes the ability to comprehend the space as the combination of identifiable geometric forms and solids. That is, the knowledge of Euclidian geometry, first to visualize the elements as they are projected to relevant orthographic planes, and then bringing them together in the linear perspective illusion of the third dimension. Importantly, any organic (non-geometric)

form to take place within this illusion is usually regarded also as a combination of geometric surfaces. In this arrangement, very frequently, the meaning is induced on the central figure (the locating of vanishing point), to and from which, the lines converge, or, the light (the halo) emanates.²¹

For quite a long time, linear perspective established a strong bond between the photographic image and painting, as an issue of pictorial representation. As Aaron Scharf argues in Art and Photography, especially the second half of the nineteenth century is marked with comments on the perspective rendering provided by the photographs and some focus on the deceptive aspects of these renderings with varied focal length lenses. In any case, the use of perspective since Renaissance signified something more than its confirmation of optical truth; which had been more fundamental was to see the world that way, to supply the appearances with a pictorial order. The fact that the photographic apparatus worked accordingly by default basically sustained this order, and constituted the photograph as analogous to optically perceived while turning it into an object of aesthetical contemplation. On the other hand, what we now assume to be the radical shift in the beginning of this century, specifically referring to scientific views concerning the uncertainty and relativity of sense data and empirical models, for once separated appearances from reality. One of the major issues is to follow the course of photographic art in reply to pictorial modes of the modern avant-garde, as shall be discussed further in this study, and to admit

²¹ When photography is concerned, the light that forms the perspective rendering takes on a special significance. Barthes states: "It is often said that it was the painters who invented Photography (by bequeathing it their framing, the Albertian perspective, and the optic of the *camera obscura*) . I say: no, it was the chemist. For the *noeme* "That has been" was possible only on the day when a scientific circumstance (the discovery that silver halogens were sensitive to light) made it possible to recover and print directly the luminous rays emitted by a variously lighted object. The photograph is literally an emanation of the referent. ...A sort of umbilical cord links the body of the photographed thing to my gaze: light, though impalpable, is here a carnal medium, a skin I share with anyone who has been photographed." (Barthes, 1991: 81)

that the photograph's status has changed since then, and that it attained a new kind of instrumentality in production of artworks.

To conclude, the last and perhaps the most important to mention regarding photography in relation to linear perspective involves the digital domain, a kind of virtual photography without the original object and a camera, but nevertheless, still, 'like photography.' As will be discussed in the final chapter, the 3D objects being digitally modeled and 'photographed' (involving the whole terminology of photography and setup of the studio, complete with lighting and varied lenses) offer a complex set of new positions for re/presentation and art, while reciprocally the wire frame models for these 'objects' refer specifically back to Renaissance perspective with a kind of reduction to geometric components.

2.4 Photography of Movement

Roughly since the Renaissance, the 'history of vision', if one may call it, has been marked by optical - mechanical devices. In certain accounts of this history, it is hardly the issue of visual representation that one may continually observe the effects of these devices. Or better, apart from the vision in art, the condition of the 'observer' is shaped by scientific and social possibilities that these offer. But nevertheless, all these optical-mechanical tools can be considered as the extensions of the human eye, enabling more than the normal scope of vision. It is by no accident that the histories of photography and cinema give a considerable weight to an evolution of this technology, usually starting with camera obscura. In certain cases, and especially when movement is concerned, the camera obscura itself, long before the image could be fixed on a

plate, gained an importance for observing bodies in motion. Displacing the static image of linear perspective with that of the impressions of the observer behind the camera obscura, Jonathan Crary comments:

At the same time one must be wary of conflating the meanings and effects of the camera obscura with techniques of linear perspective. Obviously the two are related, but it must be stressed that the camera obscura defines the position of an interiorized observer to an exterior world, not just to a two dimensional representation, as in the case with perspective. Thus the camera obscura is synonymous with a much broader kind of subject effect; it is about far more than the relation of an observer to a certain procedure of picture making. Many contemporary accounts of the camera obscura single out as its most impressive feature its representation of movement. Observers frequently spoke with astonishment of the flickering images within the camera of pedestrians in motion or branches moving in the wind as being more life-like than the original objects. Thus the phenomenological differences between the experience of a perspectival construction and the projection of the camera obscura are not even comparable. (1990: 34)

Crary goes on to say that movement and temporality observed this way was always prior to the act of representation: “Movement and time could be seen and experienced, but never represented” (1990: 34).

Indeed, even without a recorded set of images, the observation of movement through the camera yields a significant difference from that of everyday perception, the one constituted by the apparatus between the world and ‘internalized’ observer. Naturally, the concepts of afterimage, persistence of vision and the like, paraphrased as ‘the solicitation of eye (and possibly body) movement’ by Paul Virilio are the components of perception of movement, that after the fixing of the image ‘transformed into fixity by artificial lenses.’ (1994: 2) Nevertheless, the possibilities of fixing an instant of time by photographs toward the last quarter of the nineteenth century is considered to be of high importance by historians, especially in regard to painting.²² As far as visual representation is concerned, the new imagery can be studied

²² In *Art and Photography*, Aaron Scharf widely discusses the possibilities offered by the faster emulsions and consequently shorter exposure times that enabled photography of motion all throughout the second half of 19th. Century.

under two distinct categories, developed notably by two photographers: The instantaneous, isolated images of animals and human figures in motion by Eadward Muybridge, and the chronophotography of Etienne Jules-Marey.

As a British photographer working in United States, Eadward Muybridge has managed to obtain private funding to start photographing the horses in motion by early 1870's. The series of photographs, later to include the human figure in motion by the support of University of Pennsylvania, were done with a battery of cameras, usually 12 or 24 of them. The shutters being activated (later times at speeds of 1/1000th of a second) automatically by the subject itself, each camera recorded a brief moment in the lateral procession of movement. Indeed, combined with Muybridge's invention of the 'zoopraxiscope' when viewing, the whole process took the form of an early version of cinematographic illusion of movement. More important to cite here is the fact that, these images of frozen motion (especially of galloping horses) had been accepted with great enthusiasm among painters, when shown in Paris in 1881. The sensational side of the event is usually associated with the revelation that the horse, at certain instances when galloping, had all four feet off the ground without being spread in opposite directions as it was shown in previous paintings, like those by Gericault. However, as far as representation goes, what is more interesting comes out of each figure being separated from the other in time. Emerging more like a record of scientific experiment, the series are analysis of motion in an ordered progression, when separate photographs are seen side by side. It is a demonstration in splitting time itself into minute intervals, in order to reveal the frozen subject in each interval. At the same time the figure, isolated from its immediate surrounding (a laboratory condition) and fixed symmetrically in the middle of the frame, do not enable one to see direct references to paintings of the time. Moreover, the backdrop with a grid enabled the calculation of

distance, much similar to recent photographic records of experiments in physics, mostly of free fall of bodies done by using multiple flash exposures.²³ The grid and the object together, directly corresponding to the coordinate system of abscissas and ordinates and the 'curve' traversed by the object, made these photographs an object of scientific analysis: The photographed body transformed into the scientific proof of its speed in time and space.

From Degas to Francis Bacon, Muybridge's figures have been replicated in paintings, as evidence shows, but the painters used the whole work as an inventory of figures in motion:²⁴ "An extensive atlas of human and animal locomotion; a nineteenth-century equivalent to the medieval pattern-book" (Scharf, 1983: 219). On the other hand, the 'time-freeze' of the photograph have not been observed as a representation of movement on a two dimensional surface by many artists, but just a static object suspended in time and space. Some went as far to say that:

Ocularly, they are false because they present us with an image at the moment when, because of its speed and the persistence of impressions on the retina, we should be unable to see anything but a blurred image, the shape of which being made up at one and the same time of the preceding and the following positions. (Guérault, quoted in Scharf, 1983: 216)

Thus, the most truthful image was not 'what was there, but what the eye saw there'. Scharf goes on to comment on the increasing acceptance of the blurred form as resulting in the promotion of late Impressionist paintings. In fact, contrary to Muybridge's photographs, and favoring the similarity with the retinal trace of moving object, the blurred image seems to be frequently used in paintings. Considering the favorable subjects for painters, and following the 'impressions' of light on water in

²³ In most recent textbooks on physics, the multiple flash exposures of free falling or thrown objects are shown to demonstrate the gravitational force and acceleration.

²⁴ See Van Deren Coke, The Painter and the Photograph

motion, and landscapes of patches of colors and 'optical color-mixings', the fuzzy image on some photographs seem to have been preferred by many artists.

On its very basics, the representation of movement through photographs had always involved certain conventional codes to be read. In reference to visual perception, these codes can be associated with the manipulation of the Cartesian system in regard to which one perceives the world, and movement. One allusion is the induced movement in experiments on perception, in which the fixed system of reference is switched (as in the moving train), that is, the coordinate system of space itself moves, instead of the subject. In other words, movement is induced when the static 'ground' -instead of the figure- is moved. In terms of representation through photographs, this comes out through a convention established by the panning of the camera to follow the moving object, thus rendering a blurred ground and a sharp object, rather than vice-versa. In this case, the camera, as the center of this system of references, takes on the role of the moving (scanning) eye.

'Chronophotography', on the other hand, worked on somewhat different principles. Realized with a 'photographic gun' of Marey's own invention of early 1880's, the photographs rendered different phases of a moving body on the same plate, enabling superimposed forms in succession using stroboscopic principles. The results revealed more than the singular frozen figure, as Scharf comments:

Marey seemed more interested in the measurable graphic signs of movement than in the internal changes in the anatomical structure of the subject. He contrived to have the mobile figure record both its own trajectory paths and the oscillation patterns of its movement. (1983: 227-228)

Accordingly, most of his 'graphs' done after the photographs follow the succession of chosen reference points on the moving figure, with single or broken

lines, on a two dimensional coordinate system.²⁵ The most common accounts on the effect of these photographs on painting focus mostly on certain paintings by Marcel Duchamp and more importantly on the works of Balla, Boccioni and Severini, that is, the Italian Futurists, and to a degree, on Cubism.²⁶ For the Futurists, this signified an interest in “..the movements themselves rather than the objects in movement, the fundamental rhythms and patterns of the universe - so great a preoccupation in this century...” (Scharf, 1983: 255) The ‘simultaneous representations’ of the photographic image now made possible the transparency and superimposition of different instances of the object on the same picture plane, and moreover, endowed this mode of representation with the credibility of a scientific instrument. As Scharf quotes from various Futurist manifestoes that have a touch of quasi-scientific terminology, the preoccupation with representation of movement becomes apparent: “Thanks to the persistence of the image on the retina, things in movement multiply, are deformed, and follow one another like vibrations in space... motion and light destroying the substance of bodies...” (1983: 264). To Boccioni’s ‘form-force’ which represents the potential and expansive power of the object, Balla adds the ‘force-lines’, similar to the trajectory paths, the marks in painting (or sculpture) that signify dynamism. To Balla, the work should be:

1.ABSTRACT 2.DYNAMIC Relative motion (cinematograph) + absolute motion. 3.EXTREMELY TRANSPARENT....5.AUTONOMOUS, ie. resembling only itself. 6.TRANSFORMABLE...9.ODOROUS. 10.NOISY. Plastic noisiness adapted to the plastic expression. 11.EXPLOSIVE. Simultaneous appearance and disappearance in bursts.” (Manifesto of 1915, quoted in dell’Arco: 1987: 32)

²⁵ Obviously, of being very useful for conventional animation in two dimensions, the process can be considered as an anticipation of today’s ‘3D motion capture’ of computer animation

²⁶ The often referred painting by Duchamp is ‘Nude Descending a Staircase’. However, Duchamp himself, even admitting that he knew of Marey’s work, claims that this and other specific paintings from 1910-12 were a reply to Cubism rather than a mere influence of photography or the Italian Futurists. Very typical of Duchamp, that is dissociating himself from apparent camps and influences, this point is widely discussed in de Duve’s Pictorial Nominalism and by the artist himself in Pierre Cabanne’s Dialogues with Marcel Duchamp.

In final analysis, it is apt to say that the photographic representation of movement had major impact on awareness that in turn formed the production and reception of artworks; photographs, paintings and even sculpture. Seen in a context, it is important to emphasize the fascination with motion, and more importantly with speed, and their representations at the beginning of the century. In fact, as the prevailing technological phenomenon of the mentioned period, the physical speed occupied an important place within art (as in Balla's and others' fascination with the automobile and the airplane) and seen as the all encompassing trait of modern life. Once more, the photograph had simulated the perception of what Rudolph Arnheim calls the 'optical motion', "...when the projections of objects or of the entire visual field are displaced on the retina." (1974: 379). But by fixing them permanently on film, the photograph falls short of the 'kinesthetic perception', that cooperation of eye, head and body movements. Within the limits of this study, it does not seem feasible to comment on the relations between photographic representations and digital-virtual environments of today that engage kinesthetic perception, and furthermore what these offer as artistic possibilities. But it looks certain that our concepts regarding the physical speed has been altered and our fascination has been diverted into what Virilio names as 'telepresence', that is, the speed of light. How this is to be an issue of art and representation is yet to be solved. For sure, the photographic image of the thing in motion, at least for the majority, lost much of its appeal since Harold Edgerton had photographed the 'crown' of the drop of milk and the bullet in the air.²⁷

²⁷ Harold Edgerton is a photographer-engineer and the inventor of the electronic flash that is most commonly used in photography today. Since 1940's he has been making photographs of motion, either freeze frame or with stroboscopic effects, that utilize the possibilities of the electronic flash which offers exposure times much shorter than any mechanical shutter. See Stopping Time: The Photographs of Harold Edgerton. Gus Kayafas, ed. New York: Harry N. Abrams, 1987.

2.5 Abstraction and Photographic Possibilities

In contemporary artistic practices, the conceptual conflicts of 'abstraction' and 'figuration' appear to be irrelevant, especially in the sense that their opposition does not create the tension to offer new possibilities as it did in early twentieth century. However, when problematics of visual representation are concerned to include photography, this discussion becomes useful as it relates to certain photographic modes. The aim here is not to give a thorough outline of abstract painting of the historical avant-garde -i.e. in the second decade of the century- but to lay out the very basic definitions and concepts.

At the very basis of the discourse regarding abstract art are the seemingly interchangeable concepts of 'intensification' and 'essentialism' as defined respectively by an artist and an art historian; Piet Mondrian and Charles Harrison. According to Mondrian, intensification, as opposed to 'extension', suggests the path for the evolution in plastic art :

Both science and art are discovering and making us aware of the fact that *time is a process of intensification*, an evolution from the individual towards the universal, of the subjective towards the objective; towards the essence of things and of ourselves. A careful observation of art since its origin shows that artistic expression seen from the outside is *not a process of extending but of intensifying one and the same thing*, universal beauty.... Extension results in a continual repetition of nature; it is not human and art cannot follow it.
(1987: 16)

Likewise, Harrison defines essentialism as such:

...the idea of abstraction as a process tends to involve a kind of essentialism.....The abstract tendency in modern art, tended to entail the belief that a purer, or higher, or deeper, or more universal form of reality is revealed through the paring away of the incidental and 'inessential' aspects of things.
(1993: 198)

These attributes, not a definition of a style of some sort but rather rhetorical devices, are designed to explain a process of abstraction, from figurative painting to pure geometrical forms 'in dynamic equilibrium,' in Mondrian's words. As regards a proper defining terminology of abstract art, the conventional one of 'non-figurative' is appropriate, as an abstract work of art is considered not to represent objects in the world. However, one more very important trait supply a better understanding, as far as representation is concerned. And that regards the abandonment of the representation of the kind of space that recognizable, three-dimensional objects can inhabit.²⁸ These two, that is the abandonment of picturing the things in the world and of representation of space, are not exactly equivalent, but complementary within the process of abstraction. Through this process, Mondrian tends to come out with a philosophical account of pure abstraction in order to realize the fixed laws of plastic arts:

.....which govern and point to the use of the constructive elements of the composition and of the inherent inter-relationships between them. These laws may be regarded as subsidiary laws to the fundamental law of equivalence which creates dynamic equilibrium and reveals the true content of reality.
(1987: 17)

As another elaboration of the aesthetic ideals of truth and beauty, Mondrian's thoughts on geometric abstraction in painting try to establish these ideals through the constructive elements of straight line (not a curve, as he writes) and form, and, their mutual relations. Moreover, in order not to represent relations with the natural aspect of things, the 'denaturalization of matter' come out as important. Thus, when color is concerned: "In painting, the primary color that is as pure as possible realizes this abstraction of natural color" (Mondrian, 1987: 19)

²⁸ Clement Greenberg, quoted in Harrison, p.200

When all these are considered, a critique of abstraction is apparently about narration and thus the difference between art and design. The relatively old problem that abstract painting takes on more the function of decoration has been put forward many times, a danger Kandinsky observes: "...what should replace the missing object? The danger of ornamentation was clear, the dead make believe existence of stylized forms could only frighten me away"²⁹ Added to this is the fact that the mechanical execution of a geometric abstract painting had an allusion to machine made patterns, decorations and textiles. Harrison tends to defeat this criticism on the basis that we 'see in' an abstract painting: "...we do not just 'see' the surface of a painting, we 'see *in*' that surface the evidence of intentional activity of some kind. It is its invocation of this expectation of 'seeing-in', I believe, that most tellingly distinguishes abstract painting from ornament"(1993:203). This effort, though not totally clear, suggests an interplay with figurative painting, as we tend to see 'figure and ground', that is, one sort of pictorial space that contains the 'object'. Though this time the object is not a representation of a thing; in other words, the painting stands in place of a picture, but not a picture of a specific thing in Euclidian space. In fact one can say that the repetition of forms and lines in certain abstract paintings clearly bring in the ambiguity in perception of figure and the ground, and by this way look like mere decorations. In these cases, the obvious physical limits of the painting surface come into question: the function of the frame and the size of the surface and the causes for their existence as such. In form of a question, what prevents the painting surface to extend out of its boundaries, through repetition, to infinity?

Besides all these, a problem arises as abstract art questions the very necessity of representation as a parameter of art theory, within a series of arguments. The first

²⁹ Vassily Kandinsky, quoted in Harrison, p.204.

of these come from a misleading replacement of the term 'abstract' with that of 'non-representational.'³⁰ Representation had, in most cases, been associated with resemblance; in other words, the questions of representation are limited to questions about what it is that the work of art resembles. While resemblance, apparently, is not the only necessary condition for representation, at the same time, the 'meaning' in art is closely associated with the issue: "...For if there can be no representation without resemblance, then the pictorial order of the abstract painting must be seen as merely accidental, and thus as insignificant -meaningless- in human terms" (Harrison, 1993: 200) So, even in the absence of evident likeness to the objects and habitable space, abstract painting is thought to be representational in a certain way. The second argument in defense of abstraction is against the involvement of representational models with language. In this sense, to take the issue of representation as the primary concern for analysis is an attempt to enable the existence of the artwork with its linguistic translation:

The primary function of the category (representation/non-representation) has been to bridge an abyss between 'untranslatable' art and the dream of truth the beauty of art signifies; in brief, representation thematizes the problem between art and its linguistic analysis, providing an ostensive object of study where otherwise there might be silence. (Steiner, 1992: 9)

In this schema, as Robert Steiner suggests, "...psychology, theories of perception, and cultural critique offer vocabularies presumed to interpret the abstractions of art." (1992: 9) In fact, it is by no coincidence that psychology of perception still holds an important place in art and design education, following Bauhaus and especially modern architecture, to the same extent that geometric abstraction in art had been translated into issues of balance, equilibrium, rhythm,

³⁰ Like many others, Rudolph Arnheim uses this term to refer to abstract art in Art and Visual Perception.

harmony, etc., in short the mechanics of perception of pure shapes and colors, and their interrelations as abstract entities.

Following this, through a linguistic analogy, abstract paintings can be thought to refer to things outside themselves, that is, other abstract paintings. Michel Foucault comments: "Insistent affirmation of the lines, the colors that Kandinsky called 'things', neither more nor less objects than the church, the bridge, or the knight with his bow." (1983: 34) It is precisely at this moment that photography and abstract representation can be reconciled. At first, it looks obvious that photographic image and abstraction cannot be comparable, because of the very nature of photographs as the trace of the human vision, rendered through the eye -the camera- and not abstractions which are detached from this vision. From here on, one can conclude that photographs, within the specific realm of abstraction as representation, can only imitate, or better, mimic the abstract paintings. And this provides the main argument of reconciliation of photography and abstraction.

Methodologically speaking, abstraction in art, aside from being an intensification or essentialism, involves concepts of reduction and *tabula rasa*, in analogy to the scientific ones of induction and deduction. The parallelism lies, indeed, in the methods of reaching 'truth' or 'beauty' and/or both, in scientific and artistic terms. In order to understand how they relate to photographs, one should consider the terms through painting. Thierry de Duve, in his account on the historical avant-garde of early 20th century, writes that the idea of 'tabula rasa' (or the blank canvas, as he names) was entertained by many an artist, as what were to appear on this empty pictorial space was not dictated by nature itself. Via an obviously clear reference, this does not correspond to the photographer's unexposed film, contradicting with the very logic of 'taking' photographs. Whether considered as a mental state attained by the

artist or as the very basic or essential tools of picturing, the photographic mode is never likely to work in accordance. This idea, in majority of accounts on painting, suggests that these basic tools -line, form and color- supply a pictorial language that can be evaluated within itself, with no external references outside that of the picture.³¹

Supplying another link in between language and pictorial representation, de Duve continues:

Klee, Kandinsky, Mondrian, Malevich each wanted in his own manner to lay the cornerstone of a new language that they hoped would be universal, effectively non-speakable since it would be mute by nature, and yet speaking to everyone since the 'rendering things visible' (Klee's words) which it gave itself as a goal, meant that it would make the visual speak, and speak in the language of pure painting. (1991: 133)

The point, in fact, is not only to bring out the differences of a photographic language, if one may call it, with that of the one above, and obviously to show how the photographic line, form, texture or color, by their very essence different than those of painting. It is also to prove the methodological impossibility of inventing such a language.

The other way around, that is through a reduction from the "given" of the visible, can the photograph mimic the abstract painting. However, to speak of the degree of this reduction confuse the matters, and this already irrelevant attribution blurs the fine line between what is truly abstract and what is not. What concerns us here is the relatively simple and well known practices that photography employs to

³¹ In Pictorial Nominalism de Duve, in regard to the specific context of the second decade of 20th century, points out the interconnectedness of language theory of Saussure with its counterpart in 'language of pure colors', as color is 'named' and theorized by artists. At this point, a very fundamental issue that separates the making of traditional images from that of photographs is about their respective modes of operation in regard to color. A painter starts with color (paint) either to achieve a faithful resemblance to the objects depicted or, the opposite, to reduce from them in the way of making a painting, which is another object all by itself. On the contrary, the photographer has, to start with, either the presence or the absence of light even when working with color photography. In turn, color itself in a photograph is dictated by reflecting surfaces, relative and in full respect to the amount of light received, and to the physical-chemical ways that the colors are 'reproduced', instead of being produced. No manipulation of color as reproduced through the classical-chemical apparatus of photography corresponds to colors that are produced in a painting. (The photographic color theories)

achieve this mimicry. As an extension of the eye, the camera can pretend to reduce from the very objects in the world, firstly, through close up shots and sometimes through the extreme opposite, i.e.. aerial photography. In both cases, and with the absence of such clues as texture, the perspectival space can be altered, as does the viewer's frame of reference regarding the coordinate system of vision. In fact, this effect can also be explained through the lack of clues regarding 'scale', as the surfaces on the photographic image are reduced to mere flat planes, without a reference to the actual materials and objects that make up these surfaces. It is not by chance that among the attempts to bring photography and art (painting) closer, the 'suppression of detail' in photographic image became essential, specifically by the pictorialists of early twentieth century. The texture of surfaces that is rendered obsolete through use of light, or lack of it, or giving way to a pattern of photographic grain, is able to make the photograph a reduced image, a combination of pure forms, organic or geometrical. The second way to achieve this mimicry, a very photographic one by definition, is possible through the use of light, that is very contrast lighting conditions, in which the shadows -the black surfaces- take on the quality of two dimensional forms. The problems posed by this illusion are clear: the black surfaces on the photographic print, unlike the ones on a canvas, are readily perceived as referring to the absence of light. However, in certain cases, the perception is reversed in a delicate balance in order to perform what an abstract painting does.

So far, the above bring in a certain rhetorical stand against photography's imitation of painterly abstraction on a purely formal level. 'Formalism', in turn is another term of the rhetoric which has to be put in some context itself in order to make sense. Thus, the term is usually associated with certain texts (as with Kant's aesthetics), or with a body of art criticism (ie. by the critic Clement Greenberg), and

3. Art as Photography: The Photographic Image as Integral Element in Art Production

3.1 Montage and Surrealism

Among the techniques of photographic imagery, none has been more influential on today's concepts of visual representation than the photo-collage and photomontage. Within the context of early twentieth Century, these techniques refer to a wide ranging technological, social and artistic changes as the representatives of modern phenomena: from the machine, war and destruction, urbanization and the urban masses as well as the individual, to psychoanalysis and the unconscious. They are assumed to be originated from the possibilities of halftone processes and the circulation of photographs in printed press, but in turn they have shaped the imagery in mass media in a long procession until our time, through political propaganda and advertising. In fact, today, the way the digital image processing operates owes considerably to the techniques of montage and other photographic manipulations, as observed from the physical appearance of the computer interface and the screen menu, all the way to the final image: a point to be investigated further.³² On one hand, these processes can be seen as a further expansion on the 'techniques of the observer', with the possibility of a constructed reality through manipulation of time and space,

³² A recent interview with David Ross, the director of Whitney Museum is exemplary in showing how montage is considered to be the technique of the computer age. See Wired. Vol.3, N.9. Sept.95 p.150

surpassing that of the vision in common sense. Raoul Hausmann comments on the invention of photomontage:

...the idea of photomontage was as revolutionary as its content, its form as subversive as the application of the photograph and printed texts which, together, are transformed into a static film. Having invented the static, simultaneous and purely phonetic poem, the Dadaists applied the same principles to pictorial representation. They were the first to use photography as material to create, with the aid of structures that were very different, often anomalous and with antagonistic significance, a new entity which tore from the chaos of war and revolution an entirely new image...(Ades, 1986: 24)

The term 'photomontage' introduced by Berlin Dada artists, Hausmann, Hanna Höch and John Heartfield was distinctly separated from collage, especially the Cubist collage, and it signified a practice "...where the thing expressed is more important than the manner of expressing it, where the object represented plays the role of a word" (Ades, 1986: 15). It is common that the techniques of montage in photography are handled together with other art forms of historical avant-garde, specifically the Russian cinema and indeed literature. Not only the term 'montage' refers to an intrinsic practice in cinema, but also its connotations suggest a new comprehension of the world in relation to the theories of science, and of relativity, (theory of interval, non-Euclidian geometry and the fourth dimension) as well as the more obvious one of the 'engineer-monteur' of Dada. As Douglas Kahn suggests the similarities in practice, "The mere contiguity of the (cinematic) frames constitutes a technical montage by way of juxtaposition and differentiation" (1985: 113). Thus to him, the process of montage is taken to be a combination of images both in cinema and photography to construct a kind of reality. Other parallels can be found in acquiring the material to go into the montage. The photomontages of Berlin Dada, and especially of John Heartfield were done mostly by found photos from printed material, just as propaganda films of Eisenstein used newsreels as raw footage. Kahn comments on the issue:

This concurrence of labors is determined entirely by the characteristic of the material, which is first of all marked by the concurrence of physicality and sociality. All artistic processes must begin with raw material. Mass media qualifies as raw material by virtue of its violent reduction of communication and experience, actual and potential, past the reductions all cultural performances and products must work through. It is sufficiently reified to be handled physically in a manner of the traditional physical materials of the arts: wood, paint, metal, etc. Traditional materials, however, go through a transformation from physical to psychical whereas mass media starts out as psychical: its molecules are populated. (1985: 118)

Meanwhile, Anette Michelson gives an account of the theorization of montage in cinema, after an outline of the filmmakers of 'Intellectual Cinema' in Europe, most importantly of Eisenstein: "The general aim was no less than the transformation of the human condition through a cinematic intensification of cognitive accuracy, analytic precision, and epistemological certitude"(1992: 62). And this, achieved by "dynamic, rapid inter-cutting, disrupting unity of time and space, the use of alternating close-up and distance shots, overlapping motifs, double exposures and split-screen projection," (Ades, 1986: 87) had its counterparts in photomontage.

As far as representation is concerned, the photomontage seems to be employed by the historical avant-garde in several diverse modes. One, exemplified best by Heartfield aimed for a direct message as a political agit-prop image, accompanied by a text and mostly meant to appear in mass media, like the covers of AIZ (Arbeiter Illustrierte Zeitung) and also practiced widely by other Berlin Dada artists, realized as an indirect, ambiguous reflection of the 'zeitgeist' representing the fascination by the machine and the metropolis. And second, mostly realized by the surrealists, had connotations of 'automatic writing', the chance encounter of objects in the picture. Rosalind Krauss makes a sharp distinction between the Dada-montage and the Surrealist photography, where the former "...expresses not simply the fact which it

shows, but also the social tendency expressed by the fact” (1985: 25) With a linguistic analogy, Krauss further defines the representational nature of montage:

If these works were able to ‘signify’, to articulate reality through a kind of language, this was a function of the cellular structure that montage exploits, with its emphatic gaps between one shard of reality and another, gaps that... left rivers of white paper to flow around the individual photographic units...In language this exteriority manifests itself as syntax, and syntax in turn is both a system of connection between the elements of a language and a system of separation, of maintaining the difference between one sign and the next, of creating meaning through the syntactical conditioning of space. (1985:28)

Thus, by sacrificing the reality of the photograph as a trace for this kind of ‘language effect,’ the Dada-montage differed from surrealist techniques of photography, especially the darkroom manipulation. In fact the montage, in this way, reconstructs not only a new linguistic syntax, but also a new pictorial space as well. In terms of meaning, very different from the cubist collage that includes the found, in place of the painted, the montage had completely altered the perspective space of the photographic image. And by this way it introduced an even more ‘primitive’ representation of a constructed reality in which our notions of depth, size and relations gave way to a sort of reading that perhaps much resembles that of the miniatures, or a kind of hieroglyphics.

Meanwhile surrealists, and specifically surrealist writers like Breton, brought up the concept of psychic automation which was to dissolve the distinction between writing and vision. This in turn, according to Breton, was expected to “resolve the dualism of perception and representation” (Krauss, 1985: 20) In order to replace representation, which can be suspected of fraud, the surrealists put forth automatism to turn visual representation into a kind recording of the unconscious, into ‘automatic writing.’ Krauss continues: “With this directness, automatism makes the unconscious present. Automatism may be writing, but it is not representation. It is immediate

experience, untainted by the distance and exteriority of signs.”(1985: 24) In any case, the inherent problem of defining surrealism through unconscious activities of automatism and dream manifests itself by a very wide range of painting styles from Miro to Magritte. When photographs in the service of surrealist art are concerned, the same problem holds true even among the work of one single photographer (i.e. Man Ray), which range from sharp images to photograms, and to solarization and negative printing. Where the identifiable Dada montage disrupted the ‘seamlessness’ of the photograph ‘in an attempt to infiltrate reality with interpretation, with signification,’ the surrealists preferred to work with this seamless quality of photographs:

For photography, with its technical basis in an instantaneous recording of an event, captures what we could call the simultaneity of real space, the fact that space does not present itself to us as successive in nature, like time, but as pure presence, present-all-at-once. By carrying on its continuous surface the trace or imprint of all that vision captures in one glance, photography normally functions as a kind of declaration of the seamlessness of reality itself.
(Krauss, 1985: 28)

Rosalind Krauss, through a semiological analyses, further writes that it is mostly the darkroom techniques that surrealist photographers employed to guarantee the seamless look of the photograph, a faithful trace of the visible, to imply “a reality that has composed itself as a sign” (1985: 28) Among these techniques to include solarization, negative printing and photograms, the doubling (of the parts of the image on the same print) come out as an important part of surrealist imagery: “It is doubling that elicits the notion that to an original has been added its copy. The double is the simulacrum, the second, the representative of the original. It comes after the first, and in this following it can only exist as figure, or image.”(1985:28) In fact it is commonly observed in surrealist photography that doubling takes place, mostly the doubling of body parts and organs, like eyes and breasts, which themselves are double and become quadrupled after the process.

Somewhat in contradiction with the techniques mentioned above, there is a view that holds on to the inherently surreal character of straight photographs. Susan Sontag, deriving the argument from Walter Benjamin's writings and his surrealist sensibility, dismisses the image techniques of surrealist photographers of 1920's as the 'marginal exploits' in the history of photography. This view, apparently not exactly an art historical critique of a movement accompanied with a style (however diverse), is a rather global account of cultural objects labeled as 'surreal' and of a sensibility, a way of understanding phenomena. By refusing the surrealists' claim that the 'surreal' is something universal, that is a matter of psychology, she explains the intrinsically surreal character of photographs in several arguments. The first of these involves doubling of another sort: "Surrealism lies at the heart of the photographic enterprise: in the very creation of a duplicate world, of a reality in the second degree, narrower but more dramatic than the one perceived by natural vision." (Sontag, 1978: 52) The second argument is constructed around the photographs of the streets of London, Paris and New York, mostly done in 19th century:

These photographs, concrete, particular, anecdotal....-moments of lost time, of vanished customs- seem far more surreal to us now than any photograph rendered abstract and poetic by superimposition, underprinting, solarization and the like. Believing that the images they sought came from the unconscious, whose content they assumed as loyal Freudians to be timeless as well as universal, the Surrealists misunderstood what was most brutally moving, irrational, unassimilable, mysterious -time itself. What renders a photograph surreal is its irrefutable pathos as a message from time past, and concreteness of its intimations about social class. (1978: 54)

In retrospect, it becomes understandable that most surrealists had this obsession regarding the time past, most specifically in Max Ernst's use of commercial catalog illustrations of 19th century in his collages, or in Joseph Cornell's appropriations of artifacts of the past in his boxes, or in the parts of architecture that Magritte depicted in his paintings. Even when all these do not shed light on the

possibilities of making photographs in accordance with techniques of representation in a surrealist manner, they nevertheless show one of the ways that found photographs can be re-contextualized. As an offspring, the third argument that Sontag holds is deeply related to the act of collecting as an indication of a surrealist activity. Again referring to Benjamin and his fondness for collecting (especially for collecting quotations), Sontag likens the photographer to a collector, who is specifically interested in the 'rightness' and 'thereness' of the object and its image, just as the collector is interested in the standards of genuineness and uniqueness of artifacts. Calling the photographs as instant antiques, she comments: "Like the collector, the photographer is animated by a passion that, even when it appears to be for the present, is linked to a sense of the past." (1978: 77)

In terms of a method, the possibilities of collecting and of a contextualization within art happens to be common, when photographs are concerned. If the main theme of this study is to analyze the ways photographs are contextualized as art, and to do this in reference to issues of representation, then, montage as a method, and 'surrealist' photography as once practiced - together with other connotations of the term as referring to the photographic - can be considered as important instances where the previously given parameters of representation are in fact cancelled. Not coincidentally, when Foucault writes on the paintings of Magritte in This is not a Pipe, he is most focused on how an established order that conforms representation, resemblance and the linguistic is undermined through these works. Magritte does this by interchanging the word and the image, or by pitting similitude against resemblance, much like what Rosalind Krauss writes concerning photography. As Foucault states: "Resemblance has a 'model,' an original element that orders and hierarchizes the increasingly less faithful copies that can be struck from it. Resemblance presupposes a

primary reference that prescribes and classes.” And furthermore: “Resemblance serves representation, which rules over it..... similitude circulates the simulacrum as an indefinite and reversible relation of the similar to the similar.” (1983: 44)

Photomontage does the similar by simultaneously affirming the resemblance through the photographic image, and cancelling the order of space and time, much as in the same way with ‘heterotopias’ described by Foucault:

...I mean the disorder in which fragments of a large number of possible orders glitter separately in the dimension, without law or geometry, of the *heteroclite*; and that word should be taken in its most literal, etymological sense: in such a state, things are ‘laid’, ‘placed’, ‘arranged’ in sites so very different from one another that it is impossible to find a place of residence for them, to define a *common locus* beneath them all. *Utopias* afford consolation: although they have no real locality there is nevertheless a fantastic, untroubled region in which they are able to unfold..... *Heterotopias* are disturbing, probably because they secretly undermine language, because they make it impossible to name this *and* that.....(1970: xviii)

3.2 Art as Concept

As a broad category Conceptual Art generally designates a cluster of ‘post-Minimal’ forms of practice in which objects are mapped or proposed or prescribed or nominated, and in which those same or other objects are presented to view, if at all, only as contingent illustrations or demonstrations of some ‘idea’. (Harrison, 1991: 47)

To start this section with a definition will help clarify how photographs are employed and given wider possibilities as conceptual elements in artworks. Charles Harrison is the editor of the art journal Art-Language and has participated in the activities of the British group, Art & Language, which has been influential in Conceptual Art movement beginning in the second half of 1960’s, together with Joseph Kosuth in United States. The involvement of language and philosophies of

language in Conceptual Art is evident since the beginning, as Jean Francois Lyotard comments:

After philosophy comes philosophy. But it is altered by the after.....Between the two philosophies of before and after, words are revealed as things, signifiers are grasped as enigmas, writing is set down as a material thing. In other words, thought is art. One mad act is completed, that of giving the world a picture, a *Bild*, of well-formed propositions. Sentences are not propositions concerning events; they are events that happen in the world of speakers, under the same rubric as resonant, plastic, visual, or tactile arrangements. (Lyotard quoted in Kosuth, 1991: iv)

In a way, conceptual art can be viewed as a kind of ‘de-materialization’ of art, rejecting the validity of different art media such as painting or sculpture as an end in itself. In this sense, the theories of representation as related to traditional arts, to ‘picturing the world’ are being criticized, together with aesthetics as a relevant issue in art production. Once more attempting to define the nature of art, and the “form” of the artwork after the readymades by Marcel Duchamp, Kosuth states as such:

It is necessary to separate aesthetics from art because aesthetics deals with opinions on perception of the world in general. In the past one of the two prongs of art’s function was its value as decoration. So any branch of philosophy which dealt with ‘beauty’ and thus, taste, was inevitably duty bound to discuss art as well. Out of this ‘habit’ grew the notion that there was a conceptual connection between art and aesthetics, which is not true...

When objects are presented within the context of art (and until recently objects always have been used) they are as eligible for aesthetic consideration as are any objects in the world, and an aesthetic consideration of an object existing in the realm of art means that the object’s existence or functioning in an art context is irrelevant to the aesthetic judgment. (1991: 16)

In fact, this kind of a polemical stand was already put forward by many of the historical avant-garde of 20th century. The “manifesto” (of Dada, Futurists and others) had been a testament to the existence of the debate, a refusal of established norms in art and its relevance to aesthetics as such. In that sense Kosuth, especially through his writings, can indeed be considered to be the last example of an avant-garde tradition in modernist sense, his statements being perhaps the last examples of a manifesto with a very strong conviction on the nature and the function of art. And that

function is primarily an investigation into the definition of art. In this instance, for conceptual art, it was never a matter of ‘representation’ of a pictorial kind, or a medium, i.e. painting or photography, that could all by itself reveal the true function of art.

The polemical character of conceptual art in opposition to what Kosuth calls ‘formalist art’ is also imbedded in the specific setting and artistic tendencies in early 1960’s, that is the Abstract Expressionism in painting and its theoretical proponents such as Clement Greenberg. However, the new movement was not totally based on this rejection, setting itself up as a field of polemical discourse within the art world. Rather, as Kosuth maintains, Conceptual Art attempts to redefine the field of artistic activity independent of any given visual media: “Being an artist now means to question the nature of art. If one is questioning the nature of painting, one cannot be questioning the nature of art. If an artist accepts painting (or sculpture) he is accepting the tradition that goes with it.” (1991: 18) Kosuth finds traditional art media to be connected by virtue of their morphology, which presumes various givens. First is the art medium itself as a given boundary, offering limited possibilities in its ‘language’ as a closed system. Connected to this, the second determinant is in fact related to tradition, that is, a kind of evolution within this morphology. In other words, Kosuth states that a modern artwork as painting justify its position as art on morphological grounds, and moreover in reference to previous paintings as such: “Art’s ‘language’ remained the same, but it was saying new things,” and he credits Marcel Duchamp for showing that there can be another language:

With the unassisted readymade, art changed its focus from the form of the language to what was being said. Which means that it changed the nature of art from a question of morphology to a question of function...All art (after Duchamp) is conceptual (in nature) because art only exists conceptually. (1991: 18)

Obviously, these raise questions as to how to handle the photograph in such a practice detached from all concerns of art media as given: that is, the photograph not as a kind of representation (i.e. a reduction from 'reality') but simply as a presentation. As long as the photograph is a presentation, it is expected not to hide the meaning behind, as Lyotard suggests:

Thought is art because it yearns to make 'present' the other meanings that it conceals and that it does not think. There is, in art as in thought, an outburst, the desire to present or signify to the limit the totality of meanings. This excess in art and in thought denies the evidence of the given, excavates the readable, and is convinced that all is not said, written, or presented. (1991: xvi)

Foremost, this condition of being a presentation requires that a context for the photographic image to be created with a supplement, usually a text.

At first, the term 'conceptual photograph,' as it came up in quite a few articles, does not seem to be designating anything specific to the practice. One definition may provide an initial idea of what it should be: "As a testament to the existence of the idea or event it records, the conceptual photograph is a document rather than a formalist exercise in artful composition." (Colpitt, 1992: 11) On the 'event' side of this definition is the use of photographic images, mostly, in the later forms of dematerialized (or concept based) art, such as performances and actions. The photographic record of these, rather than being exhibited, mostly meant for publications, and then, more and more, this gave way to video recording and even shaped some recent examples of video art. On the other hand, as an illustration of an idea, the photographic print has been regarded important for the dematerialization of art, together with xerox copies and other relatively cheaper forms. This was also due to the fact that conceptual text or photograph as primary information, lost nothing in reproduction and could well be distributed through books and catalogues.³³

³³ All these efforts to establish a new idea for art object against the commodification of art (especially

As mentioned before, the early examples of conceptual art were primarily language based. This was "...entirely within the linguistic infrastructure which previously served merely to support art." (Colpitt, 1992: 12) One of the first conceptual artists to work in this way is Joseph Kosuth, in his 'Proto Investigation Series'. In 'One and Three Chairs', 1965, he presents three forms of knowing an object: its photograph, its material form (the object itself) and its definition in the dictionary.

Such uses of photographs in conceptual art is contextualization of a kind, in which the photographic images serve as the document of the idea that initiates and make the real substance of the work, as Robert Morgan states:

In a photograph, one experiences the image in relation to cognition; that is, one discovers a set of givens about the image which in turn identifies it as a reference to some other place and time. The process of cognition, in this case, is dependent upon understanding the reality of the image apart from its representation. In light of the fact that a photographic document operates as *a posteriori* information, insofar as it represents an object or event other than itself, the viewer must then come to terms with its relationship to the present. At this point the photograph ceases to be symbolic; instead it becomes a literal thing; in Conceptual Art, it becomes data or documentation or simply information. (1994: 34)

This employment of the photograph, in the service of a broader mission in search for a new definition of art and the artwork, has its own problems as well. But nevertheless, it should be stated that this kind of a contextualization is more valid than attempts to render the photograph artistic through pictorial conventions, especially borrowed from painting. Morgan claims that in the case of photographs in Conceptual Art, "The challenge for photography criticism becomes one of distinguishing the context in which a photograph is shown. Before any aesthetic judgment can be made, it would seem appropriate for the viewer or critic to consider

painting) proved to be somewhat futile within the short history of conceptual art. The dynamics of this is beyond the scope of this research at this stage.

the intent of the photograph -in terms not only of what it means but of how it functions.” (1994: 55)

Aside from these, one should note that conceptual art, although radically anti formal, originated in a questioning of the nature and definition of art itself, and much of it deals explicitly with knowledge. That is why the photographic image should fit into this scene as pure information. Referring back to the ideas on analytical and synthetic in art, one may well assume that photographs, as surfaces carrying information, needs to be handled accordingly. In order for this information to be processed, there should be a methodology governing the production of photographic images. On the analytical side and in scientific terms, this methodology may even require the control of certain variables (of the photographic apparatus) that determine the image within a series. This is perhaps one of the most meaningful uses of photographs in an artistic context, as shall be discussed in the following section.

3.3 Typologies

Marc Freidus, in his introductory essay for an exhibition titled ‘Typologies’ defines typology, in a simplified form, as a collection of members of a common class or type:

... It could be a grouping of physiognomic types, vernacular buildings, or species of monkeys. A typology is assembled by observation, collection, naming and grouping. These actions allow the members of the class to be compared, usually in search of broader patterns. These patterns may reveal biological constants if the subjects are living things, or social truths if the subjects are human creations. (1991: 10)

Indeed seemingly more suitable for scientific methodology, rather than an artistic endeavor, the term 'typology' poses a challenge for the common appreciation of art, or rather for the view that completely separates the informative means for sciences and arts. However, typology for scientific purposes is apt to be appropriated by artists, for the very reasons attributed to the term by scientific minds. In close inspection, a lot of artists have, for a long time, produced artworks in a series, or (in a loose usage of the term) of a certain 'type'. But the 'type' mentioned here have close associations with the idea of 'style'. Once one can see the style and the norm to be interchanged in artistic production, new possibilities begin to emerge. And photography, as a tool for artistic and scientific representations, accepted to be the most proper for this purpose since its beginnings in 1839.

Aside from natural sciences, the use of the concept of typology is frequently employed, not surprisingly, in the field of archaeology. William and Ernest Adams, in Archaeological Typology and Practical Reality give a synthetic (in the sense that the definition is synthesized after a lengthy introduction on 'type', 'class', 'typehood' and the like), and scientific definition of the term 'typology':

A typology is a conceptual system made by partitioning a specified field of entities into a comprehensive set of mutually exclusive types, according to a common criteria dictated by the purpose of the typologist. Within any typology, each type is a category created by the typologist, into which he can place discrete entities having specific identifying characteristics, to distinguish them from entities having other characteristics, in a way that is meaningful to the purpose of the typology. (1991: 91)

For the purposes of clarification, one should refer to Adams' book for a number of times, starting with the idea that there is no qualitative difference between scientific thought and everyday thought. (1991: 40) Indeed our sensory perception of the world leads the way to categorize or to classify different appearances and

phenomena, objects and mental constructs. Here, one should note the important differences between classification and typology:

...a typology is a particular kind of classification, made for the sorting of entities. A type, unlike other kinds of classes, is also a sorting category..... Classifying is, very simply, the act of creating categories; sorting is the act of putting things into them after they have been created. One is a process of definition, the other of attribution.” (1991: 47)

From here on, one can start drawing the similarities within the discursive field of the arts, again based on the Adams’ theoretical foundations. The first one is the subjectivity in creating of the typologies, as the authors suggest that every type is both discovered and invented: “..The physical members of the type (at least in the case of archaeological types) are discovered, while the mental conception and the description of the type are formulated, or in other words invented, by human minds.” (1991: 33)

The second parallelism is to be found in the ‘representational’ character, as a type involves a combination of material; mental and representational, (verbal or pictorial) dimensions.(1991:30) The third, and perhaps the most important parallelism is drawn out of the field of semiotics, as typology is considered to be a restricted language and the terms ‘langue’ and ‘parole’ are incorporated into this language system:

... We will suggest that formulation of any type involves a continual feedback, or dialectic, between its physical, mental, and communicative aspects... At least in open typologies, types evolve through use and experience like the words in any other language.....*Langue* consists of the underlying structure of the typology, its purpose, the variables and attributes that have been selected in accordance with that purpose, the rules of generating types on the basis of those variables and attributes, and the idealized type conceptions that have been generated thereby. *Parole*, in the case of types, actually involves two different kinds of performance. First, as in all languages, there is a communicative performance.... We will refer to this as type representation. But in the case of types there is also sorting performance: an ongoing dialogue between ourselves and the artifacts, so to speak. That dialogue may affect our type concepts even more than does the communicative performance. (1991:50)

Thus, laying the foundations for the legitimacy of the typological approach as a generator of a discourse, and so an artistic strategy, one should start looking into

important cases in photography. The first to be mentioned is August Sander, a German photographer who undertook the seemingly impossible mission to photograph the representatives of every social class, profession, and the like (shortly, a portrait atlas) among German people, roughly between the years 1910 and 1935.³⁴ Without any help from social scientists, Sander formulated his typologies in a so called 'Semi-Medieval' guild system, a mental construct of his own. In his lifelong project titled 'Citizens of the Twentieth Century,' the portfolios are arranged so as to start with the 'Farmer' (the earthbound man), going into the 'Metropolis' (the high civilization), and coming down to 'The Last People' (the idiots, sick, insane..). By no means a hierarchical order of social status, the headings for portfolio groups is listed as such, indicating the working methods of the artist: The Farmer; The Craftsman; The Woman; The Professions; The Artist; The Metropolis; and, The Last People. All in all, the complete portfolios were to contain 540 photographs, but Sander's work was cut short by National Socialists, who confiscated much of his work in mid 1930's. Within the artistic zeitgeist of Germany between 1910 and 30 that favored experimentation, expression and political commitment, it does seem odd that August Sander pursued quietly his long term ambitions that were scientifically laid out and objectively executed.³⁵

³⁴ Perhaps, the impossibility of the task stems from the subject itself (the human beings) which poses the most complex problem for the idea of a typology. From a humanistic point of view, one may even get terrified with allusions to earlier pseudo-anthropological photographs of different 'races' of the world, that mostly helped racists, rather than scientists. The photographs from Sander that survived the Nazi prosecution proves to be the opposite, and their importance for today's viewers is indispensable as mentioned by great many historians and art critics in recent times.

³⁵ However, the later German photographers who work in a similar vein prove that this is not a coincidence. Without relying on the stereotype of the "industrious German", one may perhaps claim that there is something about the land (heimat) that grounds its people on certain sense of objectivity. At the same time, whether Sander was against the grain of his times is explained by Ulrich Keller: "In Sander's effort to understand people as products of their respective environments and occupations there is a clear challenge to the middle-class ideal of the 'autonomous personality', which Sander himself had propagated throughout his life. As Sander declared often enough, he wished to represent the 'type.' However, he sacrificed the autonomy of the individual only in favor of a larger social framework.... (1986: 36)

When typologies are concerned, the concept of physiognomy (the physical appearance) should be handled within the realm of portraiture, types and the nature of photographic images. As mentioned before, the most significant use of photographic process since the beginning has been in portrait photography, that is, the cult of personality as observed on the mute surfaces of photographs. Not only the image of a person in a photograph is the center of attention, but also the enormity of meanings attributed to the physiognomic details, to the pose, the clothing and especially the hands make the portrait a prototype for reading into all photographic images, even the most 'abstract' ones. As banal metaphors of everyday use, one can easily speak of, say, a portrait of a building or the physiognomy of a landscape, in photographic terms, expecting as though the very essence of the object will reveal itself within the sharp details of photographic image, just like the person's character is expected to do in a good portrait. But further away from these metaphors, and specifically concerning this section, is the connection one can suggest between the concept of typology and that of physiognomy as the physical look of the 'thing', in fact since Darwin. Michel Foucault, in his analysis of the Cartesian frame of knowledge, describes this modern episteme as dependent on comparison through measurement and order:

Such, then, are the two types of comparison: the one analyses into units in order to establish relations of equality and inequality; the other establishes elements, the simplest that can be found, and arranges differences according to the smallest possible degrees. Now it is possible to use the measurement of sizes and multiplicities in establishing an order... (1970: 53)

After all, what else do we have to understand the world around us? This naively positivistic viewpoint, for all the different reasons, has been observed in recent photographic typologies in art context by many critics. Put in other words, and in form of a question; what happens when the artist takes his/her subjectivity out of the

artwork, as the true scientist does, and abandons the artistic style in favor of a norm or a type? What if the artist replaces the 'aesthetic judgment' with the control of variables that determine the look of an image, just as in a scientific experiment? For one thing, the artwork that comes out is not about scientific truth, as will be discussed.³⁶

Before concluding, the last point to mention about the concept of typology in photographic art is about the 'display' of the series of photographs. On the one hand, this aspect can be related to the subject of contextualization, in the museum, gallery space, or in a book format, in other words a contextualization induced by the channels of distribution. Thus, when Bechers' work is shown in a museum of applied arts (it actually did), the meanings it acquires are expected to be somewhat different than when it is shown among other works of art. On the other hand, and of more importance for this study, is the way that the series are displayed on the wall, in groups or in a book format; in other words the mode of presentation chosen by the artist. As a significant strategy for the typologist, Sander, for example, intended his photographs to be reproduced in a book format, within the portfolios mentioned above. Bechers, on the other hand, grouped their series on the wall either in a grid format (i.e. three high and three wide), or in a linear fashion. If sorting is a function of typologies one step ahead of classification, these choices allow us, the viewer, to make a comparative observation among the members of a type, analyzing their similarities, and also, their differences. The representations of a type work to ensure accuracy in relative rather than absolute terms.

³⁶ In any case, this is what Bernd and Hilla Becher have been doing in the past several decades: In their most comprehensive typology of 'Water Towers', the photographs were all made from the same angle of view, at a certain time of the day, under an overcast sky that supplies the most uniform lighting, and, importantly, the image of the subject occupied a certain size on the photographic paper as to allow a comparison among the members of the type. Quite independent from the intentions of the artists, the 'unexpressiveness' in their work has been contextualized by artistic authorities within 'Minimalism' and 'Conceptual Art' of recent times.

As a mental construct, it is mentioned that the typological approach can offer the possibilities to construct a discourse for the artist, just as it does for, let's say, a social scientist. In the case of photography, this has been frequently observed as a resistance against disappearance, or loss. Put in other words, the will to classify, record and preserve the expendable. In Sander's work, this was the social structure of Germany on the verge of destruction, and in Bechers' the last remnants of an industrial era, once praised and now long obsolete in the age of information. Today, in an era of rapid change (and to most, decay), one would take the easy way to ascribe the function on photographic image. But much more important than this utilitarian view, the typologies in photography assumes a critical purpose in this mediatic age. A few remarks on the idea of 'type' in relation to advertising media and its nemesis, the political propaganda should be recalled at this point. When one thinks that both propaganda and advertising employs photographic images for (and perhaps only for) the creation of stereotypes, the issue becomes clearer. Whether in the representation of Aryan Race, The Civilized World, The Typical Orient or Black Africa, or, by the same token, the ideal male or female body, the rich, the poor and the society in general, both apparatus work on the idea of 'sameness'. As an antithesis, the photographic typologies, inversely, show us the differences among the members of a type (and not a stereotype) much more than their similarities. Observed side by side, neither two of Sander's 'Craftsman' are same (or even similar), nor any of Bechers' anonymous buildings. After all, if a truth is to be revealed through an artwork, in this case, it is to be found among the nuances (not the contrasts) of the physical appearances.

4. The Readymade and its Connections to the Photograph

When Marcel Duchamp introduced the readymade into art in 1917, it was a fundamental comment on the "object" of art. To see this gesture merely as a statement that anything can be institutionalized as a work of art is an underestimation. What was at stake was also the 'retinal', and this would prove to be the starting point for a transformation in art perhaps more important than the introduction of linear perspective. Indeed the Duchampian readymade is a distant relative of later objects that were introduced, designated and contextualized within the realm of art. Nevertheless, historically, these later developments are all traced back to this first strategic decision.

As a generalized paradigm, the history of modern art has observed one important mission throughout different art media, and that can be defined as the elimination of everything that are inessential to an artwork, especially to specific art media. To use art's default dichotomy between form and content (now largely transformed by recent art theory), this purification of a sort is already handled in the techniques of abstraction, as related to the 'form' of the artwork. In regard to painting, abstraction as a reduction from the visible aspect of nature had reached to its ultimately purest form in 1920's, as exemplified in Malevich's "Black Square" by Thierry de Duve. In fact, after this, whether it was possible to continue being a painter and practice the craft of painting was the dilemma that Marcel Duchamp faced. To de

Duve, this marks Duchamp's transition from painting to the readymade, and it indicates an offspring (the readymade) of a tradition, that is, the tradition of painting: ".....the readymade, far from being a gratuitous and accessory fantasy in the art of Duchamp, was his principal contribution to contemporary art, since above all else, it reinterpreted the past with such a pertinence that endowed it with a new resonance"(1991: 188).

On the other hand, to search into the purification of the 'content' of the artwork in modern avant-garde poses the ontological question of art. Long detached from the concerns of the narrative, of its cult value and stripped of its aura, art began to exist as a disinterested tautology in itself. That is, as Kosuth mentions, art justifies its existence with no external references other than itself and the 'idea' of art: a self defined entity, its very existence being a testimony to its condition as art. In no way that any externally dictated mission (i.e. political or aesthetic) could ontologically define the artwork.

The application of the same paradigm to photography, that is the elimination of the inessential from photography as art, appears as an injustice of one kind. After all, how can anything visible be not essential to the photographic image, which 'depends' on them for its very existence? In the modernist history of photography, this required that the elimination of the inessential meant the elimination of inessential 'object' or 'texture' or 'detail', that is, a kind of fragmentation of the visible. In this sense, if there is an essence to be revealed, it is the essence of the isolated fragment. How the idea of the readymade contributes to this condition of the photographic image is the concern of this chapter.

In epistemological terms, the readymade, at first, is 'not' to be regarded as a representation: "With the readymade the representational function is simply chucked

out. The bicycle wheel doesn't represent a bicycle wheel, it is one."(James, 1991: 283)

Within these terms, the readymade introduces the ambiguity related to one of the main problems of art, that is, the transformation of the physical object. If the readymade is not a representation of a sort, how can it transform the object itself, given that this transformation is a necessary condition through which art operates? In fact, in certain regard, the same ambiguity beholds the photographic image, posing similar problems as to how the photograph transforms its object, or better, transfigures the commonplace in Arthur Danto's words, and what is at play in between the object and its photograph.³⁷ Obviously, a simile of this kind supplies the very first link in between the readymade and the photograph, opening up a new understanding of the art object in relation to both. The massive amount of writing on Duchamp's work indeed gives varied accounts of how the readymade is to be evaluated, ranging from a dichotomy in between the retinal and conceptual, to the mold, cast and seriality of mass production, and to the idea of fetish. However, the complex ways in which the common objects are contextualized as art today is still far from being totally exhausted and probably much diverted from initial intentions first figured out by Duchamp in the second half of 1910's.³⁸

The first account on the readymade to be mentioned here stems from the term 'nominalism' "as a way of thinking that conceptualizes from the name, belongs to the abstract if not to metaphysics or idealism."(James, 1991: 280) In fact, Duchamp was very much involved in this way of thinking as is evident through much of his work and

³⁷ Danto's book The Transfiguration of Commonplace is an investigation on how mass produced objects are viewed as artworks, whereas the identical thousand others are seen as mere utensils or household goods. Based on the multiple common items that are contextualized as art by especially Warhol in a popular context, rather than Duchamp's readymades that operate on different means, the book is a survey on the crisis of representation, ultimately supporting Danto's theory of the "End of Art"

³⁸ In this sense, it is appropriate to indicate the differences between the objects with ethno-cultural referents in use since Pop Art until today's installations, and those of Duchamp which pose, through deliberation, the ontological questions regarding the artwork.

their titles. His play on words, or more appropriately, verbal puns are the most extensive among the artists of this century.³⁹

To support this, de Duve labels Duchamp's passage from painting to the readymade as "Pictorial Nominalism", that is a kind of naming of the visual. Carol James, after referring to the concepts of 'literal' and 'pictorial' nominalism in Marcel Duchamp's own notes, explains the function of the readymade with rhetorical terms:

As part of the perennial pair describing verbal messages, "the literal and the figurative," the literal is the half valued for immediate clarity and devalued for lack of depth or eloquence. This rhetoric, with the implied visual metaphor of layering, the estimation that there is a sense *behind* what one sees in art, is something Duchamp wanted to cut through, and one method was the readymade. At a time when retinal painting of Impressionism, Postimpressionism and Cubism dominated and had redefined both taste and theory, Duchamp understood that art had other motivations and that he could work with this rhetoric and its irony in its verbal implications of "literal," both to bring art back into the mental and to redirect the visual beyond aesthetics. (1991: 280)

Apparently, the readymade, with its 'literal' content simultaneously cancel representation while posing questions on the ontological grounds of art. The issue of nominalism, thus, refer back to the title of this writing, that is, a contextualization. When photography is concerned, this contextualization (or the 'naming' of the photograph as art) have similarities with the rest of the objects in art context: "We see that the truth-function of art does not consist of bringing a truth or a content of knowledge to the point of its thematization; but, quite differently, that it brings itself to the point of a nomination, where that which it names is nothing other than its naming function." (de Duve, 1991: 61) However, this is not to say that epistemologically the photograph works on the same plane as any man-made, mass-produced object, even when both are culturally loaded. The traits previously handled in this writing that inevitably tie the photograph to other forms of

³⁹ See [The Writings of Marcel Duchamp](#).

representational images, also set it apart from the rest of the objects. But nevertheless, the direct link that connects the photograph and its object is in a unique nature compared to traditional images, which renders possible a kind of substitution of the object with its photograph, no matter how 'artful' the photographic image is. If nominating an object as a work of art is a kind of abstract thought, as mentioned earlier, then it seems plausible that the same object can be replaced with its photographic image within another kind of 'abstraction'.

The second account of the readymade that closely calls for the production of photographs involves an 'experience of seriality' as Rosalind Krauss states:

...the possibility....which plays a large role in the history of the reception of Duchamp's readymades, is the experience of seriality, and the position of the series within the discourse of modernism. The urinal factors into this discourse the issue of the replica, the mold, the cast, which is to say, the multiple without the original. (1991: 179)

By this way, the photograph is once more integrated in the industrial culture that it was born into, just as the readymade. The ability of the photographic image to be multiplied from a negative (the mold) becomes the integral part of the way it is perceived. However when the special conditions of this culture is concerned, especially in the first three decades of the twentieth century that also coincide with the emergence of the readymade, it becomes necessary to separate the standardized object in art context from the functionalist aesthetics. De Duve investigates the relevant tendencies of the time through Arts and Crafts movement, architecture and the Bauhaus, and finds major differences between the way functionalism operates and that of the readymade. To him, the functionalist object retained everything related to art, 'the talent, the work, the ambition', except the name 'art'. That is, "a work of art to which one denies this name in order to use it as a utensil." And the flip side of this denial is the success of the readymade:

The readymade reveals precisely what functionalism denied, the function of the name. Duchamp chooses an industrial product, displaces it, puts it to another purpose, whereby it loses all its utilitarian value, as well as all ergonomic adjustment of its form to its function, but, by the same token, gains a function as pure Symbol.However, since the readymade belongs to industry, it declares its belonging; it is the symbol of this belonging, the recording sign of industrial culture. (1991: 115)

Apparently, the possibility of any photographic image to be named as art and be seen in a totally different context than that of its initial function bears resemblance with the above. Not exactly the utensil as the mass produced object, but nevertheless multiplied to perform a function, the photograph can be seen for something other than what it shows, or as the symbol of the very function that it is intended for.

5. Conclusion: Art and Photography in the Post-Photographic Time

Since its beginning, this research has put forth a dilemma that came out of two interacting but polar conceptions of the field regarding art and photography. The former involves a kind of experiment in which the photographic image is put into a test where parameters of representation (such as mimesis, perspective and abstraction) provided the necessary condition for the photograph's status as art. This is closer to what Walter Benjamin calls "photography as art", to him an injustice to photography's mission and a misconception bound to fail from the start:

It is indeed significant that the debate has raged most fiercely around the aesthetics of *photography as art*, whereas the far less questionable social fact of *art as photography* was given scarcely a glance. And yet the impact of the photographic reproduction of art works is of very much greater importance for the function of art than the greater or lesser artistry of a photography that regards all experience as fair game for the camera. (1979: 253)

However, this experiment should be valued for one reason: although particularly interested in specific problems of representation, this is an investigation into the 'nature' of the artwork (if such a term is still valid), a kind of survey that always goes through the photograph to reach a broader understanding of art. Considering any kind of commitment in artistic practice and possibilities of a continuing production of artworks by using photographs, this research could never have taken another theme central to it: In the end, there is only one reality, that is, of art's.

The latter conception, which is bound to a wide range of cultural phenomena and ideology shaped by technology, reigns over the singular photograph, generalizes it and attempts to redefine art from the other way around, that is, in regard to the reconfigured observer. Indeed, Benjamin is the first to see this shift in perception due to technology, not only of imaging but of modes of production in general. When art is concerned, Benjamin's transformed observer becomes the masses, either in front of the cinema screen or with photographically reproduced artwork in their hands, or, experiencing architecture in a collective mode of perception long before the technical images. His insight provides the starting point for many of the arguments in this research and moreover, it does render traditional art media like painting as somewhat underprivileged in comparison especially with film, pathetically attached to its aura as an authentic artwork, demanding intense concentration from its audience in the distracted-fragmented time and space of the modern times. But however, this conception falls somewhat short in guiding the maker of the artwork, or better, by supposing a kind of democratization through photography, it apparently becomes another modernist utopia in the way of bringing art and life together.

Most of the significant commentary on photography that are referred to in this study, starting with Walter Benjamin and continued by Barthes, Berger and Sontag, nevertheless belong to an era of understanding in which the primary importance had been given to the 'truth' in the photographs. Or, in Roland Barthes' words, the 'noeme' of the photograph (that is, *that has been*) as its primary feature that authenticates the existence of the subject being photographed, also implies that any photograph is a thing of the past, belonging to a specific place and time. This set the photographic image apart from other forms of representation, verbal or pictorial. It is certainly not quite right to claim that this body of commentary -which ranges between

1931 and early 1980's- is totally superseded by the shifting paradigms in receiving, understanding, and as some call it, decoding of the photographic image. If there is an 'essence' of photography as we know it, it still lies in the processes, optical and chemical, that were introduced in 1839. But on the other hand, the shift in paradigms that are introduced primarily by digitization of the photographic image calls for a new commentary.

In this sense, one can claim that the avant-garde in art always presupposed an ability to project into future, or more precisely to point out a demand that can only be fulfilled in future. Within this vein, the major interest of the historical avant-garde of the early twentieth century was to foresee an appropriate artform, in order to bring closer art and life of the times to come, as another variant of the issue of high art and popular culture. Inside the modern zeitgeist, this future was mostly thought to be shaped by technology: whether it was the assembly line, mass production, automation, or computers (as now), the artistic advances always responded to what was considered to shape mankind's future physically and mentally. While the material base of the artwork (on the very physical level) continue to change, the issues of representation still persist as a philosophical-epistemic issue, even when they evolve into a new mode, interacting with the very nature of the 'material base' of the artwork that new technologies offer. In other words, there appears to be a necessity to reconsider the parameters of representation in the light of new technologies. In fact photography did pose a similar problem with its introduction more than 150 years ago, as opposed to traditional images and all aesthetic theories related with them. When early avant-garde art of twentieth century is concerned, the scientific breakthroughs, namely non-Euclidian geometry, atomic theory and Theory of Relativity, had

tremendous impact on issues of representation, leading to revolutionary forms of art as Timothy Druckrey observes:

In many ways, the entire twentieth century has been spent grappling with the rupture of continuity initiated in its first decade. From physics to the development of gene splicing, the logic of totalizing narratives has been eroding. As pertinent in the arts as they are in physics, biology, and politics, the themes represented by fragmentation and rupture permeate our contemporary theories of identity, race, language, and dreaming, which are splintered into bits with meanings that are neither linear nor singular. (1994: 4-5)

To incorporate this with the photographic representation of the objective world, one should note how photography had long been instrumental before the rupture was initiated, how it was born into a positivistic culture, as Virilio observes: "Photography, in fulfilment of Descartes' hopes, had been largely an art in which the 'mind' dominating the machine interpreted the results in the fine tradition of instrumental reason." (1994: 22) But in 20th Century, it becomes evident that photography exhausted the possibilities of its instrumentality 'by multiplying proofs of reality', hence the long posed problem that it became possible to take it for granted without interpreting its products. For Virilio, this marks the decline of the faith in the 'objective world':

.... because the technical progress of photography brought daily proof of its advance, it became gradually more and more impossible to avoid the conclusion that, since every object is for us merely the sum of the qualities we attribute to it, the sum of information we derive from it at any given moment, the objective world could only exist as what we represent it to be and as a more or less enduring mental construct.

Einstein took this reasoning to its logical conclusion by showing that space and time are *forms of intuition* that are now as much a part of our consciousness as concepts like form, color, size and so on. Einstein's theory did not contradict classical physics. It simply revealed its limits which were those of any science linked to man's sensory experience, to the general sense of spatial relationships which the logistics of perception have been secretly undercutting since the Renaissance and especially since the nineteenth century..." (1994: 22)

To follow the argument into recent times, and to emphasize how the new epistemology is being detached from 'vision' as it relates to the 'objective world', one should look into the new scientific-technological media of arts. More and more, as the new terminology of digital realm including digital photography, virtual reality, cyberspace, artificial intelligence, computer modeling and others gain prominence, a new formulation of the relations between technology, representation, reality and art becomes important:

How, then, can the recent development of electronic imaging be contextualized in the recent history of art? The answer does not exist as a simple shift in the structure of image formation and processing, but in a larger historical shift that, on the one hand, aligns the production of signs with technology and, on the other, links technology with communication and discourse.
(Druckrey, 1994: 5)

Not so surprisingly, in almost all references to the epistemology shaped by digital media, including ones by Paul Virilio, Timothy Druckrey, Kevin Robins, and William Mitchell, the basis of any new argument takes the photographic image as a cardinal point. Apparently, several reasons account for this comparison of the digitized image with the photograph. The first involves the 'test of reality' long established by the photograph (as argued earlier) as compared to the aspects of reality represented by the computer images. In representational terms as regards the arts, and as an ethical issue, the synthesized digital image is always compared to the photograph in the ways through which a kind of reality is conveyed. These include many of the parameters and concepts already handled in this research, including the significance of perspective, the analytical and synthetic, and even the concept of readymade. Indeed, the second reason forms a kind of technically comprehensible basis for the first one: that is, the apparent likeness of 'image capturing devices' used by digital media to the optical-chemical processes of photographic camera. The third reason to follow

involves the two separate but comparable informational means that form the foundations of photographic and digital images, one supplying an analog (continuous) representation and the other, a digital (discrete) one. Another reason why the photographic image forms the parameter for understanding the nature of 'computer art' is closely related to the processes of montage in art, as it also explains, to a certain degree, the synthesized 'computer collage.'

The first step to understand the transition from classical technology of photography into the digitized image, and the blurred line in between the two in terms of representation, is to realize the distinctions in image formation. Among the issues referred to above, the photograph as an analog representation of space in a scene, that 'varies continuously, both spatially and tonally' differs substantially from digital images, as Mitchell observes:

...images are encoded digitally by uniformly subdividing the picture plane into a finite Cartesian grid of cells and specifying the intensity or color of each cell by means of an integer number drawn from some limited range... In such images, unlike photographs, fine details and smooth curves are approximated to the grid, and continuous tonal gradients are broken up into discrete steps. (1992: 5)

From this, several conclusions follow: The first is the fact that a photograph contains an indefinite amount of information, while a digital image has a fixed amount, that is, when enlarged it does not yield more information. The second and more important conclusion is related with the ability to be reproduced and to be transferred to other surfaces. Unlike analog images which cannot be copied without a loss of quality (i.e. a photograph of an original work, or a photograph of a photograph with a second generation negative) the digital image can be reproduced and electronically transferred without any loss: "A digital copy is not a debased descendant but is absolutely indistinguishable from the original." (Mitchell, 1992: 6) Obviously, this

radically alters the reception of artworks both physically, as the images are transported long distances without a loss, and also mentally as they become ephemeral entities circulating in a virtual space. A step further from the transformation that Benjamin foresaw with the photographic reproduction of artworks, this second transformation initiates a new understanding of exhibition, originality, authorship, distribution, reception and exchange value of artworks. Nevertheless, whether digital images formed (partially or fully) through photographic means (a lens and a sensitive surface) can transform the parameters of artistic representation laid out in this research, still remains to be solved.

In these terms, some of the views presented in this research point to the transparency of the photographic medium, its relation to reality of appearances and the ways that it shaped the observer as such. Indeed, photographs ‘visualize’ in analogy, that is in analogy to the optics of human perception. As long as the image capturing devices used for digital media work in similar vein, with this kind of an analogy, a reconciliation with the classical apparatus of photography becomes possible. As photographs, first rendered through a lens on light sensitive surface, then digitized (scanned), or the images that are captured with still video cameras (or by frame grabbers from video) used in synthesizing the digital images, there is a possibility for a new extension of the photographic parameters of representation. However, as photographs are increasingly combined with other digital technologies of image formation, the ambiguities follow in regard to the truth content of the new image. And this ultimately effects our conception of representational issues in photography and how it is contextualized as art. Mitchell calls this a ‘shift from two dimensional image capture to three-dimensional model capture’:

The principle of sweeping a probe across a surface or through a volume underlies an extensive array of image-capture devices that employ a range of physical principles.... Although Landsat images, MRI (Magnetic Resonance Imaging) scans, scanning tunneling microscope images, and the like look as if they were made with a camera, the process is entirely nonphotographic and the 'exposures' are usually far from instantaneous. In fact, these sorts of pictures result from the application of scientific method in an idealized form: observations are used to construct a digital model, which is then employed in conjunction with formalized theory to produce predictions of what *would* be seen under certain viewing conditions. (1992: 64)

In fact the problem arises when photographs are more and more incorporated, blended, manipulated, contextualized, and compared with these 'constructed' images, altering the very basis of the photographic image grounded on optical reality.⁴⁰ As Mitchell suggests: "In these cases, the traditional distinction between image capture and image construction begins to break down, and perplexing questions arise. Is what we see 'real' or is it a 'simulation'?" (1992: 66) Once a digital model is constructed, the deconstruction of photographic objectivity as it relates to 'time' and 'space', is complete. In this case, the 'virtual space' works on the very same principles of photographic perspective, simulating the photograph by 'taking' the photographs of the virtual model. The computer algorithms for constructing the perspective developed in 1960's are considered to be as important as the rules laid out by Brunelleschi and Alberti, supplying a representation of space without sight, from a virtual viewpoint, that can be 'often indistinguishable from high-quality color photographs.' The all important actuality of the photograph and the presence of the photographer choosing a viewpoint is transferred to the virtuality of the machine and the computed perspective. Meanwhile, the 'delayed-time presence' of the photograph is turned into the 'real-time presence' of the computer image, mutating the fundamental trait of the photographic

⁴⁰ Paul Virilio calls this phenomenon a 'fusion/confusion', a term he frequently employs through his writings: "To my mind, this is one of the most crucial aspects of the development of the new technologies of digital imagery and of the synthetic vision offered by electron optics: the relative fusion/confusion of the factual (or operational, if you prefer) and the virtual; the ascendancy of the 'reality effect' over a reality principle already largely contested elsewhere, particularly in physics." (1994: 60)

image that was strongly emphasized through Sontag's writings in this research. As Paul Virilio observes:

... *paradoxical logic* emerges when the real-time image dominates the thing represented, real time subsequently prevailing over real space, virtuality dominating actuality and turning the very concept of reality on its head. Whence the crisis in traditional forms of public representation (graphics, photography, cinema...), to the great advantage of presentation, of a *paradoxical presence*, the long-distance telepresence of the object or being which provides their very existence, here and now. (1994: 63)

Through these, the other fundamental characteristic of the photographic image, paraphrased by Roland Barthes as "the referent adheres", is either cancelled or it gives way to a multitude of cases where a variant of the paradoxical logic prevailed, for example, as photographs (and video) are simultaneously accepted and refused as legal evidence. In fact the effect of these properties of the digital image for the arts are complex enough not to fit in the limited parameters of representation that for a long time fed the theories of art.

As stated in the introduction, this study attempts to separate the issues of visual representation from those of the broader category regarding politics and ideology, just as they are also attached to mass media including the print, television and now incorporating the computers. But without an exception, all accounts of the computer as a possible art medium, "...a universal machine, a metamedium that will contain and become all media." (Youngblood, 1989: 10) refer once more to the politics of representation. The major reason for this indeed lies in the fact that the computer imaging technology is initially developed for, and its short history is marked mostly by military purposes of surveillance, deterrence, creating decoys, simulating war machines, and that this technology is increasingly infiltrating the civilian life for the similar purposes of surveillance, control and maintaining power. In The Vision Machine, Paul Virilio writes extensively on the electronic technologies of war and its

counterpart in surveillance, as the new machine enables the 'automation of perception' (vision without sight) and he refers all the way back to the first street lamps in Paris and London in retrospect, to mark the beginnings of surveillance.

In turn, by a postmodern terminology to include 'simulation' and 'simulacra', the computer realigns the problematics of art in reference to mass media, and extends the territory of this term to include the simulated computer image or the digital photograph. When art is concerned, this alignment poses an important problem, namely a 'techno-fetishism', as observed by Kevin Robins:

The question of technology... is not at all a technological question. What seem to me of the utmost importance are the social and cultural forces that are stimulating the development of automatic and cybernetic vision. The new image technologies have been shaped by, and are informed by, particular values of western culture; they have been shaped by a logic of rationality and control... In this light, we may be less impressed about the techno-revolutionary claims being made about the transition from chemical photography to electronic imaging. In refusing to fetishize the technologies, we are..... more able to recognize and acknowledge the continuities and transformations of particular dynamics in western culture. (1991: 55-56)⁴¹

With this emphasis on a continuation, and a warning of a possible fetishism, Robins criticizes the new utopia of our times: the machine to universalize imagination and culture. In this realm of technology, the utopia becomes a kind of democratization, replacing the industrial notion of 'distribution' (i.e. of photography) with the new one of 'networking', and thus handing the control of power to masses. Indeed one would expect this to transform the entire domain of artistic activity, to

⁴¹ It is very important to note that an understanding of a continuity in this sense is indispensable both for history and theory of art. A sound example can be given from Pictorial Nominalism that, even in the case of a disruption like the readymade, Thierry de Duve finally resumes with the affirmation of a continuity: "... From this came... my desire to demonstrate that the readymade, far from being a gratuitous and accessory fantasy in the art of Duchamp, was his principal contribution to contemporary art, since above all else, it reinterpreted the past with such a pertinence that it endowed it with a new resonance. From this came the emphasis I put on the link with tradition and on a "progressive" rehabilitation of this word. From this, finally, came the concentration on a point of personal *passage* in the life and work of Duchamp, because it signalled a point of transition where what remains at stake is one of the major cultural issues of what we have come to call, too quickly perhaps, our post-industrial society: is the art of our time..."(1991: 188)

re-define it in regard to the new technology, something yet to be seen in full effect.

But in any case, apparently one should always keep in mind the previous cases where control and technology were aligned to include images/representations, as Robins comments:

In the nineteenth century, chemical photography was hailed as the first universal language. We can see more clearly now how those old photographic technologies reflected the vision and the values of western culture. In the name of universalism, they were mobilized against, and intruded into, other cultures. It is difficult to believe that it could be otherwise with the new digital electronic technologies.... The West 'can only be a name for a subject which gathers itself in a discourse,' one that 'continually seeks itself in the midst of interaction with the Other'. In so doing, the West strives to 'represent the moment' of the universal... (1991: 75)

To state it once more, this study attempted to separate itself from the politics of representation to focus mainly on the particular issues of art that are deemed more essential, and less associated with such concepts as the 'Other' that signifies either the non-western world, or the minorities and women, or any cultural identity outside the mainstream - in short the Other as marking the ground of a struggle for freedom, power and control. When photography (as a means) is concerned, to maintain this separation is of an utmost hardship especially in retrospect, because its entire history is exemplary of how the 'Other' is reconstituted to confirm ideologies and to sustain power, even when the photographic image is given the highest credit as truthful to nature. Moreover, within the specific geography (Türkiye) that this study is prepared and evaluated - in a culture itself a non-western 'subject' - to exclude such ideological references even appears to be a shortfall of a kind. But, by once again stressing the possibilities for the 'disinterested' character of art, and by giving the term 'art' (as a programme) the highest privilege among all other representations that yield ways of knowing, and furthermore by replacing the 'political reconstitution' with a borrowed

phrase of 'transfiguration of the commonplace' through which art-as-photography also operates, one can refer back to reconciliation of issues in this study.

The phrase is borrowed from Arthur Danto, an author informed in the field of philosophy which makes his writings extremely valuable for any discussion of art today. Unlike any other field of discourse, philosophies of art and their continuously changing states throughout history are expected to illuminate one of the rather unlit questions that repeatedly appeared in this research, that is, the ontological grounds of art. In turn, why aesthetics 'as it was' did not form one of the major parameters to analyse the photograph's status as art will again be answered through Danto's theory of 'The End of Art'. To him, this theory come to mean not the end of making artworks, but of its 'history':

....I began to believe, appropriating a famous thesis of Hegel's, that with the disclosure or discovery of its true philosophical nature, art attains the end of its history....The thought that art is something which reaches a sort of historical end, beyond which it turns into something else -beyond which it in fact turns into *philosophy*- was proposed by Hegel in his lectures on the philosophy of art in Berlin in 1828. This implies a very different master narrative for art than that which, enunciated by Vasari, had governed the production and appreciation of art in the West until late in the nineteenth century. Vasari also believed art comes to an end, in the sense that its defining problems get solved, after which there is nothing left to do but apply the solutions to the various tasks artists are called upon to do. (1992: 7-8)

With this, as mentioned in the very beginning, Danto calls our time 'the post-historical period of art', to him a complete liberation that relieves the artist from the burden of the history of art, or better, of being historically correct. And in connection, the transfiguration of the commonplace comes to mean that art exists as its own philosophy, or rather, the difference between an object of art and a 'mere real thing' have to be non-perceptual. Danto admits this to be an achievement not of Duchamp and the readymade, but particularly of Andy Warhol and his 'Brillo Box':

What Warhol's dictum amounted to was that you cannot *tell* when something is a work of art just by looking at it, for there is no particular way art has to look. The upshot was that you could not teach the meaning of art by examples.... The eye, so prized an aesthetic organ when it was felt that the difference between art and non-art was visible, was philosophically of no use whatever when the differences proved instead to be invisible. (1992: 5)

Just as it is the case, with an obvious simile, it becomes possible to conclude that the photograph works the same way in art context, that there may be no way of telling whether it is art just by looking at it, and that it is 'contextualized' as art. In these terms, one can say that photography is a means used within the broader programme of art, and that this status of photography does not indicate a kind of negative judgement of value. On the contrary, with all its characteristics and potential that are referred to in this study, and moreover with its controversial (and subversive) role in the digital realm, the photograph continues to be the most influential form of image in artistic practice today, provided that it can detach itself from redundant parameters of art.

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